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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly eighty years ago, the United States Supreme Court first
offered its now iconic description of the prosecutor's duties within
the American criminal justice system: "[W]hile he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one."1 This exhortation from Berger v. United States
is frequently cited by courts reviewing claims of prosecutorial
misconduct, defense counsel raising those claims, and academics
commenting on prosecutorial behavior. 2 Yet a striking gap exists
between the strong rhetoric of Berger and other prosecutorial
misconduct cases, the realities of prosecutors' behavior, and the
judicial responses to that behavior. 3 "Berger... is routinely cited
4
but largely ignored."

1 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
2 Bennett L. Gershman, "Hard Strikes and Foul Blows:" Berger v. United States 75
Years After, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 177, 179 (2010).
3 See, e.g., id. at 205 (noting "the dissonance between Berger's clarion call to prosecutors
to play fairly and by the rules, and the reality of prosecutorial practice today"); id. at 20506 ("Courts reverse some of these cases; editorial writers occasionally chastise some of these
prosecutors; and academics continue to bemoan the sorry state of criminal justice, the
inability of prosecutors to behave properly, and the failure of courts, lawmakers, and
disciplinary bodies to make prosecutors accountable."); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial
Misconduct and ConstitutionalRemedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 721-22 (1999) (reasoning
that courts' labeling of behavior as prosecutorial misconduct is "almost cost-free" because
the harmless error doctrine allows courts to avoid providing any remedy for the misconduct
when the courts conclude that it did not affect the outcome).
4 Gershman, supra note 2, at 206. Gershman offers an excellent critique of the reasons
why Berger has had so little impact despite its stirring rhetoric:
Berger's description of the flagrant misconduct of the prosecutor and its
inspiring rhetoric about the proper use of prosecutorial power [has] had no
role in deterring and punishing misconduct by prosecutors. It established
no rule of law; it merely reiterated the contemporary understanding of the
prosecutor's role to seek justice. Berger established no standards to guide
prosecutors except for its broad command to prosecutors not to strike the
types of foul blows committed by Singer. In view of its facts, and its
ambiguous recognition that prosecutors are allowed to strike hard blows to
win convictions, Berger could not serve as a meaningful precedent in those
instances where prosecutors engage in less overtly prejudicial conduct.
Id. at 196.
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Prosecutorial misconduct is behavior that violates the legal
standards imposed on prosecutors.5 The word "misconduct" should
not be read to cover actions that are legally permissible but morally
or ethically repugnant, 6 or to imply that the prosecutor must act
deliberately. 7 Even with the term limited in that Way, prosecutorial
misconduct is an extremely broad term, covering a wide range of
behaviors that can occur at any point, from before charges are filed
to while a case is on appeal.8 This Article focuses on perhaps the
most amorphous type of prosecutorial misconduct: trial
misconduct. 9 Trial misconduct, as the name implies, occurs at trial
5 Henning, supra note 3, at 721 ("Since Berger, courts have applied the prosecutorial
misconduct designation almost reflexively, as a shorthand method of describing whether the
government attorney acted outside the bounds of acceptable advocacy."). There is, however,
some debate over the breadth of the conduct that gets labeled "prosecutorial misconduct."
See, e.g., Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in Addressing
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 401 (2011) ("Because few
prosecutors found to have committed misconduct are bad actors whose violations were
deliberately or malevolently intended, 'misconduct' is loaded and an arguably misleading
way to describe the problem." (citations omitted)); James A. Morrow & Joshua R. Larson,
Without a Doubt, a Sharp and Radical Departure: The Minnesota Supreme Court's Decision
to Change Plain Error Review of Unobjected-to ProsecutorialError in State v. Ramey, 31
HAMLINE L. REV. 351, 395-400 (2008) (arguing that courts should distinguish between
"prosecutorial error," which occurs "when the prosecutor's conduct may be harmless or an
honest mistake," and intentional "prosecutorial misconduct").
6 See George A. Weiss, Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson, 60
DRAKE L. REV. 199, 203 (2011). For a discussion of prosecutorial ethics as opposed to legal
misconduct, see ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 143-61 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
7 See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Mental Culpability and ProsecutorialMisconduct, 26
AM. J. CRIM. L. 121, 133 (1998) (observing that when analyzing prosecutorial misconduct
claims, courts typically consider whether the behavior was objectively improper and
whether it affected the outcome of the trial, instead of considering the prosecutor's
subjective intent or motivation).
8 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 6, at 125 (listing various forms of misconduct, including
courtroom misconduct, mishandling of evidence, tampering with witnesses, and improper
behavior during grand jury proceedings).
9 Professor Davis uses the similar term "courtroom misconduct," which she defines as
"making inappropriate or inflammatory comments in the presence of the jury; introducing or
attempting to introduce inadmissible, inappropriate or inflammatory evidence;
mischaracterizing the evidence or the facts of the case to the court or jury; committing
violations pertaining to the selection of the jury; or making improper closing arguments." Id.
While that formulation is helpful, this Article does not deal with Batson violations in jury
selection, as appellate courts use a different framework to review that type of misconduct than
they do to review the other types of misconduct described in this Article. See Henning, supra
note 3, at 780-96 (discussing a variety of types of prosecutorial misconduct and how courts
analyze them, including a discussion of how Batson analysis differs from other types of
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in the presence of the jury. 10 Trial misconduct is surprisingly hard
to define," in part because knowing what is improper requires a
12
contrast with a discussion of what prosecutors are allowed to do.
In general, however, prosecutorial trial misconduct involves appeals
to matters that the jury should not consider. 13 As explained in more
detail below, these improper appeals likely have a greater effect on
jury deliberations than appellate courts currently recognize, 14 and
prosecutorial trial misconduct is both severe and pervasive in
15
American criminal trials.
Despite Berger's ringing denouncement of prosecutorial
misconduct nearly eighty years ago, such behavior remains both
severe and pervasive in large part because of the significant
substantive and procedural barriers courts impose on defendants
challenging inappropriate prosecutorial behavior.' 6 Substantively,
misconduct analysis). Additionally, while Davis is correct that prosecutorial trial misconduct
can involve conduct other than improper remarks in closing argument, that type of conduct is
the most frequent and encompasses many of the types of misconduct that she lists.
10 See Henning, supra note 3, at 797 (discussing misconduct at trial and the prosecutor's
role "in calling witnesses, introducing evidence, and arguing the case").
11 See Weiss, supra note 6, at 213 (noting that prosecutorial remarks at trial that violate
due process constitute a category of prosecutorial misconduct that is the broadest and
hardest to define of all misconduct).
12 See, e.g., Rosemary Nidiry, Note, Restraining AdversarialExcess in Closing Argument,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1307-08 (1996) (maintaining that prosecutors "may discuss
properly-admitted facts, including the probity of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses,
and the application of the law," and contrasting those tasks with actions that prosecutors
should not take).
13 See Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutorsand Trial Judges, 50 TEX.
L. REV. 629, 643 (1972) ("I cannot define prosecutorial misconduct with precision, but I can
suggest a simple and obvious test that seems apphcable in most circumstances and that might
lead to findings of error in many situations in which the courts today excuse prosecutorial
conduct. The basic issue should be whether the prosecutor's conduct was designed to induce a
decision not based on a rational assessment of the evidence. If so, the conduct should be held
improper.'). Professor Alschuler's formulation includes an intent component ("the prosecutor's
conduct was designed to") but otherwise is fairly similar to the ethical standard in the ABA
Rules on prosecutors' conduct: 'The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would
divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence." AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 106 (3d

ed. 1993).
14 See infra Part III.
15 See infra Part II.C.
16 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 6, at 130 ("The [United States Supreme] Court's rulings
have sent a very clear message to prosecutors-we will ... make it extremely difficult for
challengers to prevail; and as long as you mount overwhelming evidence against
defendants, we will not reverse their convictions if you engage in misconduct at trial.").

20151

MITIGATING FOUL BLOWS

315

case law on what constitutes prosecutorial misconduct versus what
conduct is proper is, at best, extremely muddled. 17 Procedurally,
appellate courts impose barriers that, singly and together, make it
nearly impossible for a defendant to successfully challenge
8
prosecutorial misconduct that the trial court failed to remedy.'
Under the plain error doctrine, appellate courts often refuse to
review claims of prosecutorial misconduct if defense counsel failed
to object at trial, or they impose additional burdens on claims that
they do review. 19 Furthermore, even when courts do find that the
defense attorney properly objected and the prosecutor committed
misconduct, courts frequently refuse to impose any meaningful
sanction on the prosecutor for that misconduct. 20 Instead, courts
often rely on the doctrine of harmless error, concluding that the
prosecution had such a strong case against the defendant that the
21
misconduct was harmless.
Appellate courts therefore inadvertently facilitate rather than
prevent prosecutorial misconduct. 22 The harmless error focus on
the strength of the state's case incentivizes, or at least fails to
create a disincentive, for prosecutors to commit trial misconduct

17 See, e.g., Charles L. Cantrell, ProsecutorialMisconduct: Recognizing Errors in Closing
Argument, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 535, 537 (2003) (discussing the confusion in applying the
Griffin test for determining whether a prosecutor's comments are indirect references to the
defendant).
18 See infra Part IV (discussing how appellate courts fail to provide adequate remedies
due to overreliance on procedural doctrines).
19 See infra Part IV.A.2 (explaining the inadequate judicial treatment of the plain error
doctrine, which applies when defense counsel fails to object at trial to alleged prosecutorial
misconduct).
20 See, e.g., Lawton P. Cummings, Can an Ethical Person Be an Ethical Prosecutor? A
Social Cognitive Approach to Systemic Reform, 31 CARDOzO L. REV. 2139, 2150-51 (2010)
(noting that courts rarely impose sanctions, even if the misconduct "leads to wrongful
conviction"); Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute
ProsecutorialImmunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 519 (2011) ("[P]rosecutors who engage in
misconduct... are subject to discipline less than 1 percent of the time.").
21 See, e.g., Michelle Ghetti & Paul Killebrew, With Impunity: The Lack of Accountability
of a CriminalProsecutor, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 349, 353-54 (2012) (discussing a Louisiana
study of prosecutorial misconduct that indicated that courts find harmless error in
approximately two-thirds of the cases involving misconduct); Johns, supra note 20, at 512
(discussing a 2007 California study indicating that courts found harmless error in 390 out of
433 cases of misconduct).
22 Gershman, supra note 7, at 132.
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when they have a strong case.23 Prosecutors also have incentives
under the current system to commit misconduct when they have
weak cases, as the risk of an appellate court ordering a new trial is
less significant than the risk of an acquittal at trial.24 And in any
event, if defense counsel fails to object, then prosecutorial trial
misconduct is almost certainly cost-free. 25 So the current law on
prosecutorial misconduct "has provided prosecutors with a comfort
zone that fosters and perhaps even encourages a culture of
26
wrongdoing."
But the causes of prosecutorial misconduct and its effect on
jurors and judges go beyond rational decisionmaking based on
incentives. Many scholars lament that prosecutors face strong
incentives to win at all costs while facing little realistic threat of
discipline or sanction if they cross ethical lines; that line of
argument implicitly treats prosecutors as rational actors who
make cost-benefit decisions about their behavior. 27 That account,
23 See, e.g., David Keenan et al., The Myth of ProsecutorialAccountability After Connick v.
Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 212 (2011), http://www.yalelawjourn
al.org/pdfY1018_hpkwev93.pdf ("By reducing the likelihood of reversal, the harmless error
standard substantially weakens one of the primary deterrents to prosecutorial misconduct.
Knowing that 'minor' misconduct is unlikely to jeopardize a conviction-on appeal, prosecutors
may be more likely to bend the rules in the pursuit of victory.'); Michael D. Cicchini,
Prosecutorial Misconduct at Trial: A New Perspective Rooted in Confrontation Clause
Jurisprudence,37 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 367 (2007) ('Under the existing framework, if a
prosecutor has a strong case, the misconduct will only make it stronger. There is virtually no
risk of reversal because the trial court and reviewing court will simply find that, given the
strength of the State's case, the defendant would have been found guilty even without the
misconduct, and therefore denying him a new trial will not prejudice him.").
24 See Cicchini, supra note 23, at 367 ("In this situation, the misconduct increases the
chance of conviction .... ").
25 See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the plain error doctrine, which limits appellate review
of errors that were not objected to at trial).
26 DAVIS, supra note 6, at 130; see also Rodney J. Uphoff, On Misjudging and Its
Implications for Criminal Defendants, Their Lawyers and the Criminal Justice System, 7
NEV. L.J. 521, 544 (2007) ('The expanded use of harmless error not only allows questionable
verdicts to stand, it does little to discourage misconduct and sloppy practices in the
administration of justice.").
27 See Barbara O'Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between
Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in ProsecutorialDecision Making, 74 Mo.
L. REV. 999, 1002 (2009); see also Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors,31 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2119, 2127-28 (2010) (arguing that the "rhetoric of fault" suggests that prosecutors
care more about winning cases than doing justice, and encouraging engagement with
prosecutors about how to improve behavior).
This fault-based rhetoric assumes that
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while not wholly incorrect, is too narrow. Instead, "[p]rosecutors
sometimes make biased decisions... because people generally are
biased decision makers. A cognitive explanation for prosecutorial
bias suggests that improving the values of prosecutors is not
enough; an improvement in the cognitive process is required."28
Although much has been written in recent years about how
cognitive biases impact various aspects of the criminal justice
system, 29 very little has been written about how cognitive biases
may impact prosecutorial misconduct. 30 This Article is the first to
use cognitive bias research to shed light on the pervasiveness of
prosecutorial trial misconduct, the ways that prosecutorial trial
misconduct may affect jurors and reviewing judges more than has
prosecutors make decisions based on rational cost-benefit allocations, so scholars propose
remedies to change the prosecutors' cost-benefit calculations. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke,
Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1587, 1590 (2006) [hereinafter Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision
Making] (summarizing common strategies, including "more stringent ethical rules,
increased disciplinary proceedings and sanctions against prosecutors, and professional and
financial rewards").
28 Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making, supranote 27, at 1614.
29 For just a few recent articles about the impact of cognitive bias on various aspects of
the criminal justice system, see, e.g., Mary Nicol Bowman, Full Disclosure: Cognitive
Science, Informants, and Search Warrant Scrutiny, 47 AKRON L. REV. 431, 453 (2014)
(discussing reliance on informants in search warrant applications); L. Song Richardson,
Police Efficiency and the FourthAmendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1145 (2012) (discussing "the
effects of implicit social cognitions on officer behavior"); Anna Roberts, (Re)Forming the
Jury: Detection and Disinfectionof Implicit JurorBias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 833-47 (2012)
(explaining the role of implicit and explicit bias in the selection of jurors and in jury
decisionmaking); Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and
Opportunitiesfor, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 7, 78 (2010) (summarizing a cognitive approach that examines the
"individualized suspicion" inquiry that police officers make).
30 Professor Alafair Burke has written several articles that apply cognitive science to
prosecutorial decisionmaking, but none of her articles have focused specifically on
prosecutorial trial misconduct. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories, 97
IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1478-83 (2012) [hereinafter Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories]
(discussing cognitive bias impacts on jury selection); Alafair S. Burke, RevisitingProsecutorial
Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 494-96 (2009) (applying cognitive science to Brady disclosures);
Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. &
LIBERTY 512, 517-18 (2007) [hereinafter Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias] (describing
cognitive biases that can lead prosecutors to charge factually innocent suspects and then
ignore or undervalue evidence of innocence). The one article to use cognition research to
analyze issues of prosecutorial misconduct is Lawton P. Cummings's article, Can an Ethical
Person Be an Ethical Prosecutor?A Social CognitiveApproach to Systemic Reform, supra note
20, at 2146-56. It is discussed in more detail in Part 11.B below.
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previously been recognized, and the ways that appellate courts'
overreliance on procedural doctrines prevents meaningful
remedies from being provided to defendants whose cases are
tainted by prosecutorial trial misconduct.
This Article therefore asks courts to use cognitive bias research
to rethink their treatment of prosecutorial trial misconduct, and
particularly procedural barriers to these claims. Specifically, Part
II explains the types of arguments that constitute prosecutorial
trial misconduct, discusses cognitive biases that likely affect
prosecutors when they make improper arguments, and explains
the severity and pervasiveness of prosecutorial trial misconduct in
criminal cases. Part III explores the likelihood that juries are
more affected by prosecutorial misconduct than has been
recognized to date, drawing on prominent theories of jury
decisionmaking and showing how prosecutorial trial misconduct
likely exacerbates jurors' cognitive biases. Part IV describes
appellate courts' failures to correct these problems, given their
overreliance on the procedural doctrines of harmless error and
plain error, and describes cognitive biases that likely affect
appellate court review. Part V provides solutions to this problem,
including significant changes to the harmless error doctrine and
moderate changes to the plain error doctrine as used in
prosecutorial misconduct cases. These changes would help courts
clarify what behavior really does constitute trial misconduct and
provide a meaningful remedy for defendants whose trials have
been impacted by misconduct, while still affirming convictions in
cases where the misconduct was unlikely to have affected the trial.
Finally, Part VI explains how these changes should help minimize
future misconduct by prosecutors, provide a meaningful remedy
for serious misconduct, and strengthen the credibility of the
criminal justice system.
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II.

PROSECUTORIAL TRIAL MISCONDUCT IS FREQUENT, SEVERE,
AND LIKELY A RESULT OF THE INHERENT COGNITIVE PRESSURES OF
PROSECUTORS' UNIQUE ROLES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Prosecutors serve a unique dual role in the criminal justice
system: to prevent the guilty from going free and the innocent
from being convicted. 31 "[T]he more we learn about human
behavior, the less confident we should be about whether
32
motivations are malicious, intentional, or even wholly conscious."
Focusing on the cognitive dimensions surrounding prosecutorial
misconduct is valuable, "not because all prosecutors are well
intentioned, but because suggesting that only bad-intentioned
prosecutors are at risk of poor decision making is simply too
easy." 33 A well-established body of cognitive science research
shows that people's decisions are impacted by cognitive biases, i.e.,
errors in how we process or remember information that skew
decisions in a predictable direction. 34 Prosecutors are not immune

[The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
32 Susan A. Bandes, Framing Wrongful Convictions, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 5, 7.
33 Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making, supra note 27, at 1614. The same
reasoning applies to decisions made by jurors and judges in these cases as well. See
Bandes, supra note 32, at 21-22 ("Ironically, categorizing conduct as blameworthy may
have a perverse effect at this level of processing as well. People will go to great lengths to
avoid thinking of themselves as the kind of people who commit unethical behavior. This
does not necessarily mean they will avoid the behavior. Instead, they may avoid facing its
unethical nature or its harmful consequences, thereby entrenching the behavior and further
insulating it from correction.").
31 See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 307-08 (listing several types of bias and noting that
when circumstances lead people to certain expectations, "[tihis can lead to error biased in
the direction of the expectation"). This research does not absolve people of responsibility for
poor decisions, but instead suggests that if we understand the ways that they can skew
decisionmaking, we can search for ways to neutralize their effects. Id. at 322. See also
Bowman, supranote 29, at 449 (defining cognitive bias as "errors in how [people] process or
remember information that skew decisions in a predictable direction").
31
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from these cognitive biases, and their unique role in the criminal
justice system imposes significant cognitive pressures on them.35
This section first explains the variety of different types of
improper arguments that are commonly found in criminal
appellate cases, as appellate courts' failures to draw clear lines
between proper and improper behavior opens the door for cognitive
biases to play a significant role in prosecutors committing
misconduct. This section then discusses the various types of
cognitive biases that likely affect prosecutors who commit
misconduct, and it concludes by explaining the severity and
pervasiveness of prosecutorial trial misconduct.
A. PROSECUTORIAL TRIAL MISCONDUCT INCLUDES MANY TYPES OF
IMPROPER ARGUMENTS, AND COURTS SOMETIMES FAIL TO
DISTINGUISH CLEARLY BETWEEN PROPER AND IMPROPER
STATEMENTS

Given the fine line between proper argument and prosecutorial
trial misconduct,
even well-intentioned
prosecutors may
sometimes cross the line inadvertently, and the cognitive biases
discussed later in this section make such line-crossing more
common. In closing arguments, the prosecutor has the chance to
sum up the evidence within a narrative framework to help the jury
understand and interpret the evidence. 36
During closing
arguments, prosecutors can properly sum up the evidence, offer
reasonable deductions from it, and respond to arguments of
opposing counsel.3 7 While reviewing courts often formally treat
closing arguments as just being about a logical summation of the
evidence, advocates and advocacy experts go beyond that narrow
formulation to use rhetorical devices to move the jury, emotionally,
toward a favorable decision. 38
"Closing argument is thus a
35 See infra Part II.B.
36

See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 643 (reasoning that proper arguments will likely

encourage "a decision ... based on a rational assessment of the evidence").
37 Craig Lee Montz, Why Lawyers Continue to Cross the Line in Closing Argument: An
Examinationof Federal and State Cases, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 67, 73 (2001).
38 See Ryan Patrick Alford, Appellate Review of Racist Summations: Redeeming the
Promise of Searching Analysis, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 325, 330-31 (2006) (describing the
gap between judicial treatment and actual practice in summation, and noting that the
courts' ignorance of the "extra-logical dimensions of prosecutorial argumentation" has led

2015]

MITIGATING FOUL BLOWS

dramatic departure from the earlier parts of the trial; counsel is
released from the highly-regulated process of fact[-]finding and
permitted to use evidence combined with rhetorical skills to
convince the fact[-]finder that her inferences are correct." 39
The subsections below explore some of the ways that
prosecutors making closing arguments get carried away with
rhetoric and make improper closing arguments. In doing so, it
does not attempt to catalog every type of prosecutorial misconduct
in closing; instead, it discusses several types to show both the fine
line between proper and improper comments and how this
misconduct can be far more harmful than courts typically
recognize.
1. Arguments that Rely on Prosecutor's Credibility. One
common type of improper rhetoric in closing rests on appeals to the
prosecutor's inherent credibility or attacks on defense counsel's
credibility. Closing arguments are supposed to be based on the
evidence and inferences from the evidence. 40 But credibility
arguments often deviate from that approach, with potentially
devastating effects.
For example, prosecutors commit misconduct by offering their
personal opinions, including "vouching" for prosecution witnesses.
"Vouching occurs when the prosecutor interjects his personal
opinion about the credibility of a witness or the strength of the
evidence as a whole." 41 Most courts conclude that it is misconduct
for prosecutors to make "I" statements such as "I think" or "I

them to significantly underestimate the prejudicial impact of racial prosecutorial
misconduct); see also John B. Mitchell, Why Should the Prosecutor Get the Last Word?, 27
AM. J. CRIM. L. 139, 146-56 (2000) (discussing various studies about the importance of
closing argument in juror decisionmaking).
39 Nidiry, supra note 12, at 1306; see also Montz, supra note 37, at 73 ("Yet as much as
the trial is a search for the truth, as an advocate, closing argument is an opportunity to
convince the jury to believe your theory of the case as the correct one.").
4o See Cantrell, supra note 17, at 544-45 (stating that "[ainy comment concerning the
credibility of a witness must be based solely upon the evidence and fair inferences
therefrom," and arguing that "[tihe line is crossed when the prosecutor clearly interjects his
interpretations of the testimony"); Montz, supra note 37, at 115 (reasoning that a prosecutor
asserting a personal opinion about the credibility of a witness constitutes misconduct
because "it may lead the jury to convict on the basis of evidence not presented").
41 Montz, supra note 37, at 114-15.
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believe." 42 For example, prosecutors are generally not allowed to
offer their personal opinion about the credibility of a witness or the
guilt or innocence of the accused. 43 The prosecutor also cannot
present himself or herself as having expert knowledge about law
enforcement, nor can the prosecutor urge the jury to consider that
knowledge. 44
These prohibitions are designed to prevent
prosecutors from making their own credibility an issue in the case
and to support jurors in deciding cases based on the evidence and
45
legal rules rather than on extraneous considerations.
46
Courts often fail, however, to draw clear lines in this area.
For example, some courts allow "I think" or "I believe" statements
that are consistent with the evidence in the case. 47 Additionally,
when a prosecutor calls a witness a "liar," courts sometimes treat
the propriety of that remark as turning on whether the court
thinks that the evidence sufficiently supports that conclusion, 48 so
the exact same comment can be proper or improper depending, on
the evidence in the case. 49 Even when courts label these
statements as improper, however, they often treat these
statements as harmless error. 50 In doing so, courts underestimate
the power of these statements. Research consistently shows that
42 See Cantrell, supra note 17, at 543 (asserting that "[i]n the majority of cases," use of
the word "I" signifies that the prosecution is offering improper testimony); cf. Montz, supra
note 37, at 110-11 (noting that use of 'r' language is typically found to be harmless error).
43 Montz, supra note 37, at 108.
44 See Cantrell, supra note 17, at 553 (discussing a case in which the court found that a
prosecutor improperly presented himself as an expert witness when he emphasized his
experience in law enforcement to rebut defense counsel's argument regarding typical
criminal behavior).
45 Montz, supra note 37, at 108.
46 See, e.g., Morrow & Larson, supra note 5, at 369-86 (concluding, upon discussion of the
Minnesota Supreme Court's jurisprudence on prosecutorial vouching, that the "cases
defining prosecutorial vouching are confusing and contradictory," and suggesting that the
court more clearly define acceptable standards of conduct).
47 Cantrell, supra note 17, at 543.
48 See Montz, supra note 37, at 116-20 (collecting cases indicating that courts are split as
to whether and under what circumstances counsel may refer to a witness as a liar).
49 See Cantrell, supra note 17, at 545 (noting that the Second Circuit has held that calling
a witness a liar is not improper where the testimony is disputed and the use is not
inflammatory).
50 See, e.g., Ex parte Rieber, 663 So. 2d 999, 1014 (Ala. 1995) ("[Elven if these comments
were to be viewed as expressions of the prosecutor's personal opinions and, thus, as
'crossing the line' of permissible argument, they, nonetheless, would not constitute
reversible error.").
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jurors inherently find prosecutors to be more credible than defense
counsel.5 1 These statements play on those perceptions in powerful
ways: "This method employs a devastatingly powerful approach
combining the stature of the prosecutor's office with his experience
and knowledge of the case. He is, in effect, becoming a witness
52
advising the jury as to the guilt of the defendant."
2. Distortions of the Record or Legal Standards. Counsel
cannot misstate either the facts or the law.5 3 Regarding the facts,
prosecutors must not argue outside of the record.5 4 For example,
prosecutors commit misconduct when they exaggerate what the
testimony shows, including forensic evidence.5 5 They also cannot
argue theories that are unsupported by, or even inconsistent with,
the admitted evidence. 56 Prosecutors also should not suggest that
inadmissible evidence exists 57 or that they have chosen not to
61 See, e.g., Cantrell, supra note 17, at 542 (discussing the power of prosecutorial
credibility); Mitchell J. Frank & Osvaldo F. Morera, Trial Jurors and Variables Influencing

Why They Return the Verdicts They Do-A Guide for Practicingand Future Trial Attorneys,
65 BAYLOR L. REV. 74, 99-100 (2013) (discussing findings about the importance of
credibility determinations).
52 Cantrell, supra note 17, at 542.
13 See Montz, supra note 37, at 111-14 (surveying cases discussing the impropriety of
counsel's misstatement of the law in closing argument).
54 See Cicchini, supra note 23, at 342 (summarizing several types of improper closing
arguments, including those that "mak[e] assertions that are false or, even if true, were not
introduced into evidence").

15See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Closing the Door on Misconduct: Rethinking the Ethical
Standards that Govern Summations in Criminal Trials, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 915, 920
(2011) (discussing how a prosecutor's exaggeration of forensic evidence during closing
argument led in one case to an innocent man being found guilty of murder). Professor
Medwed notes that this type of misconduct is one of the most common that contributes to
wrongful convictions. Id.
56 See, e.g., id. at 921-24 (asserting that "prosecutors have aided in producing wrongful
convictions by advancing novel arguments or theories during closing argument that were
wholly unsupported by the evidence presented at trial," and describing one case in which
the prosecutor argued a strained theory to persuade a jury to wrongly convict the
defendant).
51 See Cantrell, supra note 17, at 548 (discussing the tendency of prosecutors to "appeal
to the jury's sense of fair play by implying that their hands are bound by the rules of the
legal system, or that they are not allowed to bring a necessary witness to court"). Similarly,
prosecutors should not refer to evidence known to be inadmissible, although Professor
Sullivan notes that courts often treat that error as harmless, notwithstanding the fact that
such references undercut the trial court's role in determining what evidence will be
admissible and the potentially powerful effect that such evidence can have on juries. See J.

Thomas Sullivan, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in Arkansas Criminal
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present additional evidence. 58 These arguments are particularly
problematic when the prosecutor references prior convictions or
other highly inflammatory, inadmissible material. 59 Somewhat
related, although distinct, misconduct involves prosecutorial
arguments that are inconsistent with inadmissible evidence
known to the prosecutor. 6 0 For example, prosecutors cannot
prevent evidence from being admitted and then argue that the
61
absence of that evidence supports the defendant's guilt.
With respect to the law, the prosecution cannot suggest that the
defendant has the burden to present evidence, essentially shifting
the burden of proof to the defendant. 62 Prosecutors are clearly
forbidden from arguing directly that the jury can consider the

Trials, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 213, 237-39 (1998) (discussing both evidence known
to the prosecutor that is ruled inadmissible and evidence known only to the prosecutor).
58 Cantrell, supra note 17, at 548-49. This ploy is designed to (or at least can have the
effect of) making the prosecutor seem like a trusted ally of the jury--someone who would
not waste the jury's time. Id.
59 Id. at 549-50. Some of these attacks are at least arguably based on inferences from
the record, but many of them are based instead on pure speculation, and they invite the
jury to similarly speculate. See id. at 550-52 (collecting cases in which the prosecution
drew improper inferences either from evidence admitted for limited purposes or from facts
lacking evidentiary support).
6 See Bazelon, supra note 5, at 392-94 (discussing a case in which the prosecutor knew
that the defendant had previously made an exculpatory statement in an interview that was
inadmissible as evidence, but nonetheless argued in court that the defendant's failure to
deny his guilt in another, admissible interview was clear evidence of his guilt).
61 See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 168 F.3d 700, 702-05 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding
improper the prosecutor's argument to jurors that the absence of corroborating testimony
from the defendant's wife suggested that the defendant was guilty, where the prosecutor
had previously threatened the wife with criminal charges if she testified in the defendant's
favor at trial); State v. Kassahun, 900 P.2d 1109, 1113, 1116 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding, after the trial court had granted the state's motion in limine to preclude discovery
of murder victim's gang affiliation, that the prosecutor committed misconduct by implying
that the defendant was untruthful because he failed to offer objective support for his belief
that his business was being overrun by gangs); see also Bandes, supra note 32, at 16
(describing the case of Rosa Bennett, the author's client, in which the prosecutor failed to
notify the defense that Bennett had been arrested in a torn and bloody sweater, then
argued that there was no physical evidence corroborating Bennett's story that the victim
had attacked her on the night in question).
62 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 57, at 232 n.103 (describing a case in which the court
reasoned that even though the prosecutor improperly attempted to shift the burden of proof
by suggesting that the defendant failed to produce witnesses, any error was harmless
because the jury was later instructed on the state's burden of proof).
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defendant's failure to testify as evidence of guilt.63 Yet prosecutors
often raise the issue indirectly, for example, by referring to
uncontroverted evidence 64 or pointing out the defendant's failure
to rebut a particular piece of evidence when the defendant was the
only one capable of doing so. 65 Similar misconduct includes
commenting on a defendant's post-arrest silence (his or her failure
to provide police with an explanation or defense after arrest,
regardless of whether the defendant testifies at trial) and
suggesting that the defendant has a duty to put on evidence other
than his or her own testimony. 66 "This is a dangerous area which
courts monitor closely, and about which they admonish
prosecutors regularly."6v Even so, courts often find misstatements
of the law to be harmless error because jurors are presumed to
follow the properly given jury instructions rather than counsel's
68
statements.
3. InflammatoryArguments. One of the most troubling types of
inflammatory arguments involves appeals to race, ethnicity, or
religious discrimination. 69 These cases involve a strikingly wide
variety of conduct or images, including explicit appeals to racial
prejudice, 70 use of animal imagery in connection with the
63 The prosecutor violates a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights indirectly by referencing
a defendant's failure to testify. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 165 (1965). But the line
between improper, indirect comments on silence and proper inferences from the record is
often a very difficult one. See Cantrell, supra note 17, at 537, 538-40 (discussing
application of the Griffin test for determining prosecutorial misconduct).
6 See Cantrell, supra note 17, at 537.
65 See Cicchini, supra note 23, at 341; see also Sullivan, supra note 57, at 231-32
(discussing the lines that the Arkansas courts have drawn in these types of cases).
66 See Cantrell, supra note 17, at 540-42 (noting that using a defendant's silence in this
way amounts to a deprivation of due process).
67 Gershman, supra note 7, at 150. Professor Gershman notes that prosecutors "are
adept at using language that conveys the illegitimate message ... subtly," which
contributes to the difficulty of clearly distinguishing between proper and improper
comments. Id. at 151.
68 See Montz, supra note 37, at 112-13 (recognizing that courts presume that the jury

follows the court's instructions).
69 See, e.g., Andrea D. Lyon, Setting the Record Straight: A Proposal for Handling
ProsecutorialAppeals to Racial, Ethnic or Gender PrejudiceDuring Trial, 6 MICH. J.RACE
& L. 319, 320 (2001) (discussing the consequences of "foul blows" struck by prosecutors who
improperly inject race or gender bias into jury deliberations); see also Alschuler, supra note
13, at 639-40 (summarizing the courts' inconsistent treatment of cases involving race and
religious appeals).
70 See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739,
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72
defendant, 71 and use of caricatures linking race and violence.
While courts sometimes will call these appeals improper, 73 in other
cases courts will go to great lengths to ignore the racial overtones
or to justify the remarks. 74 Although the United States Supreme
Court stated in 1987 that "[t]he Constitution prohibits racially
biased prosecutorial arguments,"75 commentators suggest that
racial appeals have simply become more subtle rather than
76
disappearing from prosecutorial arguments.

1752-53 (1993) (describing cases with fairly explicit racial appeals, such as cases specifically

referencing racial crime statistics or referring to Native Americans being unable to handle
liquor and therefore committing crimes). Johnson's article also details many other types of
racial images found in the case law, although the article does not always indicate when courts
found the prosecutor's remarks to be proper versus improper. See id. at 1751-59.
71See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 n.7, 181 n.12 (1986) (noting that the
prosecutor referred to the crime as the work of "a vicious animal," and said that the
defendant "shouldn't be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him and a prison guard at
the other end of that leash"); see also Johnson, supra note 70, at 1747, 1752 (describing the
use of animal imagery in various cases, including in the Rodney King case).
72 See Alford, supra note 38, at 344-59 (discussing the earlier, explicit forms of the "Black
brute" caricature and the continuing power of that stereotype to drive both social policy
decisions and criminal trial verdicts today, even when race is never explicitly referenced).
73 See, e.g., State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 557 (Wash. 2011) (holding that the prosecutor
improperly injected racial prejudice into the trial by using the term "poleese" when
questioning witnesses and invoking an alleged African-American anti-snitching code, and
reversing the defendant's conviction as a result).
74 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 70, at 1781-83 (discussing numerous cases in which the
courts failed to acknowledge the racial overtones of various types of arguments); Alford,
supra note 38, at 343 (discussing how one court ignored the inherent racism in comparing
the defendant to a gorilla, despite the known racial slur involved); Lyon, supra note 69, at
327-28 (discussing Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1995), in which the Seventh
Circuit "said that it was not clear the prosecutor's references to 'shucking and jiving'
regarding a Black witness on the stand, and to 'Superfly' regarding the Black defendant,
would have been significant to a White jury;" the court also suggested that these terms
could be "accepted as a natural and racially neutral part of speech").
75 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n.30 (1987) (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,
416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).
76 See Alford, supra note 38, at 332-33 (cataloging efforts by prosecutors to pander to
racial basis). The exact scope of what constitutes race-based prosecutorial misconduct is an
important but difficult question. As Alford notes, courts are not adept at drawing this line.
Id. at 328, 339-44. When courts do find arguments to be racist, however, then the Equal
Protection Clause is implicated, which shifts the burden to the state to prove that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden-shifting makes it easier (at least
ostensibly) for a defendant to obtain reversal. See id. at 338-39 (demonstrating how the
Equal Protection Clause is implicated and arguing that "courts must consider racist
argumentation prima facie evidence of a violation of [that clause]"). Additionally, at least
one court has provided for heightened scrutiny of race-based prosecutorial misconduct based
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Prosecutors sometimes inappropriately appeal to other types of
prejudice as well. These appeals can relate to wealth or class, to
patriotism, to the jurors as taxpayers or parents, etc. 77 They may
distance the jurors from the defendant in terms of a particular
78
trait or appeal to the emotion related to that trait.
Each distinct group carries its peculiar set of biases. If
the prosecution can successfully appeal to these
dormant instincts, it may arouse the jury to convict in
order to protect the shared values inherent to the
groups. The obvious danger is that any doubts in the
case will be resolved against the accused because he is
79
not a member of the group.
Although many inflammatory remarks reflect in-group versus
out-group logic, there are other types of improperly inflammatory
remarks as well. For example, prosecutors sometimes improperly
appeal to law and order sentiments, such as urging the jury to
"send a message" by convicting the defendant or arguing that the
case is particularly important.8 0
Similarly, the prosecutor
generally should not use war imagery, such as talking about the
'War on Drugs," although such comments are sometimes upheld
either as not being improper or as at least not leading to

on the denial of the right to a trial by an impartial jury. See Monday, 257 P.3d at 557-58
(holding that this violation was not harmless error).
17 See Cantrell, supra note 17, at 561-62 (discussing various prejudicial and improper
appeals utilized by prosecutors).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 562; see also Ryan Patrick Alford, Catalyzing More Adequate Federal Habeas
Review of Summation Misconduct: PersuasionTheory and the Sixth Amendment Right to an
Unbiased Jury, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 479, 518 (2006) ("The effect of fear within an inflammatory
summation should also not be underestimated, particularly considering the racial dynamics
of closing arguments in criminal trials ....'When people's mortality is made salient, they
punish more severely those who transgress cultural norms .... They indulge in more
racial/cultural stereotyping. And they attribute more blame to members of outgroups.
Thus, fear provokes fallacious reasoning, and undercuts rational decision-making
processes.' (footnotes omitted) (quoting Neal R. Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptionsand
Blaming in 9/11 Cases, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 959, 973 (2003))).
80 Cantrell, supra note 17, at 554-55. But see Sullivan, supra note 57, at 228 (noting that
Arkansas courts typically conclude that "send a message" arguments are proper).
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reversal.8 1 Additionally, prosecutors should not appeal to jurors'
fears, for example, by arguing that they should put themselves in
the shoes of the victim or by arguing that failure to convict will put
their own or others' safety at risk.82
Professor Charles Cantrell notes the particular danger posed by
such inflammatory arguments: "The use of inflammatory
argument employs a unique and serious risk. By appealing to the
passions and prejudices of the jury, the prosecution introduces
anger and fear into the deliberative process of determining guilt or
innocence. This leads to irrational decisionmaking based on
emotions rather than facts."8 3 Yet courts often allow prosecutors
84
wide latitude in making inflammatory arguments.
B. PROSECUTORIAL BEHAVIOR MAY BE AFFECTED BY CONFIRMATION
BIAS, INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES, AND MORAL DISENGAGEMENT
MECHANISMS, GIVEN THE UNIQUE ROLE OF PROSECUTORS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

The lack of clarity between proper and improper arguments, as
well as some prosecutors' lack of training,8 5 may make prosecutors
particularly vulnerable to various types of cognitive biases that
likely contribute significantly to prosecutorial trial misconduct.
Confirmation bias may lead prosecutors to overestimate the
likelihood of defendants' guilt, institutional pressures make it
81 See Cantrell, supra note 17, at 556 (noting that some cases have upheld the use of war
analogies "if the defense invites such a response" by, for example, comparing the
government's case to a bomb).
82 Id.
at 555-57. Cantrell suggests that these bald appeals to fear are more likely to lead
to reversal than other types of errors. See id. at 556 ('The personalization of fear to jurors
is infinitely more reversible than generalized appeals to enforce society's laws."). He does
not, however, provide sufficient support for the idea that these types of appeals are likely to
be considered reversible error. See also Montz, supra note 37, at 102-04 (discussing the
impropriety of "Golden Rule" arguments that ask the jurors to put themselves in the
position of one of the parties, such as feeling how terrifying the victim's situation was, and
asking them to decide based on "personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence").
83 Cantrell, supra note 17, at 554.
84 Sullivan, supra note 57, at 242.
85 Prosecutorial trial misconduct may stem from a prosecutor's lack of experience or
training. Montz, supra note 37, at 69. But many of the commonly accepted causes of
prosecutorial misconduct, such as the role of the adversary or the lack of remedies against
misconduct, contribute to the cognitive biases discussed in this Part. See id. at 69-70
(explaining that "[prosecutorial] misconduct may be a byproduct of the adversarial system").
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seem crucial for prosecutors to obtain convictions, and moral
disengagement theory suggests ways that beliefs could lead
prosecutors to commit misconduct in pursuit of convicting the
guilty without believing that they are doing anything wrong.
. One of the most likely types of cognitive bias affecting
prosecutors is confirmation bias. "Confirmation bias, as the term
is used in psychological literature, typically connotes the tendency
to seek or interpret evidence in ways that support existing beliefs,
expectations, or hypotheses."8 6 Because of confirmation bias,
people unwittingly select and interpret information to support
their preexisting beliefs.8 7 Confirmation bias also leads people to
discount the significance of information that should undercut their
preexisting beliefs.8 8 Prosecutors are not immune from these
cognitive tendencies to seek out and recall information that
supports their beliefs and to discount contrary information.8 9
Confirmation bias leads prosecutors to be overconfident in their
conclusions about the guilt of particular defendants. 90
"[P]rosecutors' assessments of guilt can be flawed both by the
information provided to them and the feedback they
receive." 91 The information provided to prosecutors may be
incomplete because the police investigation may have been shaped
by tunnel vision. 92 And the high rates of plea bargains before trial
and convictions post-trial reinforce prosecutors' beliefs that the
93
defendants they prosecute are guilty.
Prosecutors may be particularly vulnerable to overconfidence in
defendants' guilt because of institutional pressures. 94 Prosecutors
Findley & Scott, supra note 34, at 309.
Barbara O'Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate and
Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 315,
316 (2009).
88 See Findley & Scott, supra note 34, at 313-14 (noting that people resist change even
where new information "wholly undermines their initial hypotheses").
89 See Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias, supra note 30, at 516-17 (providing specific
examples of the influence of these cognitive tendencies on prosecutorial decisions).
90 See Findley & Scott, supra note 34, at 371 ("Confirmation bias tends to produce, among
other things, overconfidence about the accuracy of one's own judgments.").
86
87

91 Id. at 329.
92

Id. at 329-30.

93 Id. at 330.
9 See id. at 327-31 for an overview of the institutional pressures on prosecutors and how
they may be vulnerable to flawed appraisals of defendants' guilt.
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are often under great pressure to win convictions; that pressure to
convict can come from a variety of sources, including the way that
the public views prosecutors, the need for prosecutors to campaign
to keep their jobs, and the political process of funding prosecutors'
offices. 95 The adversary system itself similarly exacerbates these
pressures. 96 The relatively limited direct contact that prosecutors
have with defendants and their families, combined with
prosecutors' near-daily contact with victims, police officers, and
other witnesses, likely shapes how prosecutors perceive their
cases.9 7 Thus, institutional pressures and confirmation biases
likely combine to overemphasize seeking convictions and to deemphasize protecting the innocent.
Moral disengagement theory then suggests a mechanism for
even well-intentioned prosecutors to cross the line and commit
trial misconduct. 98
Moral disengagement theory posits that
individuals generally do not act contrary to their perception of
what is moral, so individuals use a series of "moral disengagement
mechanisms" to adapt their view of what is moral. 99 Professor
Lawton Cummings argues that one moral disengagement
mechanism that allows prosecutors to commit misconduct without
believing that they are doing anything wrong is an excessive focus
on obtaining convictions, without any counterbalancing emphasis
on following ethical rules. 10 0 Another type of moral disengagement
mechanism involves obscuring "the causal relationship between

95 See Cummings, supra note 20, at 2147-48 (describing, among other pressures, the fact
that "[p]rosecutors' careers are directly hampered or enhanced by their conviction rates").
96 See Findley & Scott, supra note 34, at 322-23 ('The adversary system has many
virtues, but one byproduct of an adversary model is that it polarizes the participants,
imposing pressures on them to dogmatically pursue their own perceived interests or their
own assessments of the proper outcome of a case.").
91 See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutorand Tunnel Vision, 49
HOW. L.J. 475, 486-87 (2006) (describing who prosecutors interact with and arguing that
"the prosecutor will establish relationships, develop empathy, and build loyalties in ways
that are bound to affect her conception of justice, and how it is best served").
9s See Cummings, supra note 20, at 2142 (reasoning that certain features of the
prosecutorial system encourage prosecutors to disengage their morality).
99 Id. at 2142-43.
100 Id. at 2151. Moral disengagement mechanisms are ways that individuals short-circuit
their self-sensoring against immoral behavior and reconstruct their conduct as being
morally, justified. See id. at 2143 ("[These] mechanisms... operate to disengage an
individual's moral self-sanctions from injurious conduct .... ").
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the individual's conduct and the outcomes of the behavior."' 01
Professor Cummings applies that concept to prosecutors who may
excuse bad behavior under theories about zealous advocacy and
10 2
the adversarial system.
The final type of disengagement mechanism involves
depersonalizing the target of the conduct. 10 3 Cummings notes that
"[d]efendants in the criminal justice system are systematically
depersonalized from the prosecutor's perspective, because the
prosecutor has intimate contact with all parties involved except
the defendant."10 4 And even the common practice of using the
term "defendant" rather than the individual's name is a form of
depersonalization, let alone the derogatory terms or images found
10 5
in many prosecutorial misconduct cases.
Therefore, prosecutors who are overconfident about their
assessments of defendants' guilt may convey those beliefs to the
jury by vouching for the prosecution witnesses or the strength of
the case. 10 6 Prosecutors overly focused on obtaining convictions
may use language suggesting that defendants have a duty to
present evidence, or they may comment unfavorably on the
Zealous prosecutors may go from
defendants' silence. 10 7
dehumanizing defendants in small ways like avoiding the
defendants' names 08 to more serious inflammatory appeals based
on race or class, 10 9 or they may ask the jury to send a message by
convicting." 0 These are easy moves to make given the lack of
clarity in the case law regarding proper versus improper
101Id. at 2151-52.
at 2153.
102 Id.
at 2154 ("[Targets of harmful conduct are depersonalized and blamed for
103 See id.
bringing about their own suffering." (footnote omitted)).
104 Id.
105 See id. at 2154-55 (describing the use of words such as "slime" or "dirt" to describe
defendants); see also id. at 2156 ('Through depersonalization of defendants, the wielding of
power over defendants, and the adversarial posture toward defendants, prosecutors are
encouraged to morally disengage from harmful acts toward defendants.").
106 See Montz, supra note 37, at 114-15.
107 See Cantrell, supra note 17, at 539-40 (discussing one case in which the prosecutor
asked jurors to ask themselves who else might have testified).
108 Cummings, supra note 20, at 2154.
109 Lyon, supra note 69, at 320.
110See Cantrell, supra note 17, at 554-55 (discussing prosecutors' use of law and order
appeals to encourage juries to convict).
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arguments,' 1 ' the cognitive pressures that prosecutors face, 112 and
the lack of appellate court punishment for crossing those lines." 3
C. AS A RESULT, PROSECUTORIAL TRIAL MISCONDUCT IS PERVASIVE
AND SEVERE

Prosecutorial trial misconduct is both pervasive and severe. In
terms of pervasiveness, empirical research supports the idea that
prosecutorial misconduct is widespread. 1 4 For example, the
Northern California Innocence Project's recent study found that
state and federal appellate courts in California concluded that
prosecutorial misconduct had occurred in more than 700 cases over
a twelve year period, which equates to more than one instance per
week of prosecutorial misconduct." 5 This study almost certainly
drastically understates the pervasiveness of the problem, in that it
only dealt with misconduct that was found by appellate courts in
available decisions; it did not include trial court decisions finding
that prosecutorial misconduct had occurred or cases in which the
courts declined to decide whether prosecutorial misconduct
occurred. 1 6 Another study, conducted by the Center for Public
Integrity, examined more than 11,000 cases in which prosecutorial
misconduct allegations were reviewed on appeal; the appellate
courts reversed convictions or granted other remedies in more
than 2,000 of these cases, and they found misconduct had occurred
117
but excused it as harmless error in hundreds more.
M See

supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
113 See infra Part IV.
114 None of the empirical studies on prosecutorial misconduct distinguish trial misconduct
from other types of prosecutorial misconduct. Given the lack of available data specifically
dealing with trial misconduct, this section relies on the data for prosecutorial misconduct
generally. It would be useful, however, for empirical research to be conducted that
specifically focuses on prosecutorial trial misconduct as opposed to other types of
prosecutorial misconduct.
115 Johns, supra note 20, at 512-13 (summarizing the findings of the Northern California
112

Innocence Project); KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFF & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE
PROJECT, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA

1997-2009, at 2 (2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Report_Prosec
utorialMisconductOftenUnpublished inCalifornia.php.
116 Johns, supra note 20, at 513.
117 Angela J. Davis, Feature, The American Prosecutor:Power, Discretion, and Misconduct,
23 CRIM. JUST. 24, 33 (2008); Steve Weinburg, Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers When a
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Additionally, empirical research shows that appellate courts
rarely reverse convictions based on prosecutorial misconduct. For
example, the authors of a recent Louisiana study found that the
appellate courts in Louisiana reversed in only 13.3% (20/150) of
cases in which they concluded that the prosecutor had committed
misconduct. 118 In more than 19% (29/150) of the cases in which
courts found prosecutorial misconduct, the courts concluded that
the defendant had failed to object or was otherwise procedurally
barred from relief, 119 while in 67% (101/150) of the cases, the
courts concluded that the error was harmless. 120 Similarly, a 2007
study by the California Commission on the Fair Administration of
Justice showed that the California appellate courts reversed
convictions in only 12% (53/443) of the cases in which they found
that prosecutorial misconduct had occurred. 121 "So, thinking that
a reversal is going to cure a wrong that was done within the
122
system is ... naive.
Instead, prosecutorial misconduct can have significant
consequences, not only for criminal defendants but for the entire
criminal justice system.1 23 For example, prosecutorial misconduct
has been found to be a significant contributing factor in wrongful
convictions.1 24 "As the 2009 report of the Justice Project observed,
ProsecutorIs Cited for Misconduct?, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (June 26, 2003, 12:00
AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2003/O6/26/5117/breaking-rules.
Again, this study only
included cases in which the misconduct was discovered and litigated. Davis also discusses an
extensive investigative report done by two reporters from the Chicago Tribune in the 1990s
that involved similar findings to the studies described above. Davis, supra, at 35. See
generally Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Part 1: The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB. (Jan.
11, 1999), available at http://www.chicagotribune.comnews/watchdog/chi-020103triall-story.h
tml#page=l.
118 Ghetti & Killebrew, supra note 21, at 353.
119 Id. at 353-54.
120 Id.
at 353.
121 See Johns, supra note 20, at 512 (describing the results of the study, which analyzed
cases spanning a decade). "This study was followed up by an annual report for 2010
documenting 130 judicial findings of prosecutorial misconduct in 102 cases, 26 of which
resulted in reversals of convictions, orders for new trial, or orders barring prosecution
evidence." Id. at 513.
122 Ghetti & Killebrew, supra note 21, at 353.
123 See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 5, at 441 (concluding that prosecutorial misconduct
implicates both the constitutional right to a fair trial and "the integrity of the criminal
justice system as a whole").
124 Johns, supra note 20, at 510.
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'prosecutorial misconduct was a factor in dismissed charges,
reversed convictions, or reduced sentences in at least 2,012 cases
since 1970.'"125 Similarly, another study found that 43% of 180
DNA exonerations
involved
allegations
of prosecutorial
misconduct. 126 In such cases, prosecutorial misconduct "may
result in an innocent person going to prison and the actual
127
wrongdoer remaining free to commit future crimes."
Additionally, these wrongful convictions, and the role that
prosecutorial misconduct plays in their occurrence, can undermine
1 28
the criminal justice system's overall effectiveness.
The effect of prosecutorial misconduct can also be significant
even when used against a defendant who actually committed the
charged crime. 29 Prosecutorial misconduct "undermines the due
process afforded to the accused,"130 which in turn may make
defendants think that they can never get a fair trial.13 1 That in
turn "promotes increased cynicism by participants of the justice
system and the public alike." 132 Defendants who go to trial take

125

Id.

at 512 (quoting JOHN F. TERZANO ET AL., THE JUSTICE PROJECT, IMPROVING

PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A POLICY REVIEW 2 (2009), available at http://amlawdail
y.typepad.com/JusticeProjectReport.pd).
126 Id. (citing Panelists Examine Why Prosecutors Are Largely Ignored by Disciplinary
Officials, 74 U.S.L.W. 2526, 2526 (Mar. 7, 2006)).
127 Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 407; see also
Johns, supra note 20, at 515 (discussing in more detail the terrible toll that wrongful
convictions take on those wrongfully convicted, on the crime victims and their families, and
on those who become victims of crimes committed by the original perpetrator while the
wrong person is incarcerated). Wrongful convictions can also have significant financial
consequences as well. See id. at 515-16 (discussing costs that the state bears from
conducting trials, housing inmates, and sometimes paying damages in civil courts).
128 Alschuler, supra note 13, at 638 ("When our system of criminal procedure fails to
ensure a high degree of certainty of guilt, criminal punishment loses some of its
effectiveness as an instrument of social control. For this reason, arguments by prosecutors
that tend to make juries less deliberate, less reflective, and less dispassionate cheapen the
criminal law.").
129 For a very good discussion of the need to go beyond concerns of factual innocence to
broader concerns of systemic fairness, see Bandes, supra note 32, at 16-18.
130Joy, supra note 127, at 407.
131 Gershman, supra note 2, at 132.
132 Id.; see also Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories,supra note 30, at 1475 (discussing
the social science research about the importance of procedural justice in overall respect for
and compliance with the law).
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significant risks in terms of sentencing; those risks should not be
133
compounded by inappropriate prosecutorial behavior.
Prosecutorial trial misconduct is also very public, usually occurs
in front of juries, and may affect the jurors' perceptions of the
criminal justice system, whether consciously or not. In fact, the
public nature of these actions can undermine public respect for law
enforcement and even the law itself.1 34 "The undermining of the
public's confidence is exacerbated by the fact that minorities and
the poor suffer the most from prosecutorial misconduct."1 35 This
behavior can also paint all prosecutors in a negative light, even
those who "uphold the law and live up to their obligations to seek
justice."136

For all of these reasons, including the role prosecutorial
misconduct plays in wrongful convictions, its harmful effects on
individual defendants, and its harmful effects on the justice
system as a whole-even when it is used against factually guilty
defendants-prosecutorial trial misconduct is a serious problem,
and it is more serious than similar misbehavior committed by
criminal defense counsel or in civil cases.1 37 Prosecutorial trial
misconduct is a significant problem, worthy of focused attention,
133 See generally Steven P. Grossman, An Honest Approach to Plea Bargaining,29 AM. J.
TRIL ADVOC. 101 (2005) (arguing that the differential sentencing of criminal defendants
who go to trial versus those who plead guilty imposes a punishment on the defendants
exercising their trial rights). See also Alschuler, supra note 13, at 631 (explaining how
defendants are uniquely affected by misconduct because they are vulnerable given that
their liberty is at stake in trials).
134 Alschuler, supra note 13, at 632-33.
135 Johns, supra note 20, at 516.
136 Id. (quoting RIDOLFF & POSSLEY, supra note 115, at 6).
137 See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 69, at 335-36 (arguing that because "the prosecutor's
primary responsibility is to the administration of justice" and bar associations do not
provide sufficient accountability, the courts must remedy any misconduct in criminal
proceedings). Cf. Montz, supra note 37, at 102-29 (canvassing types of improper closing
arguments in civil and criminal trials); Nidiry, supra note 12, at 1318 (arguing that because
"defense attorneys do not share the prosecutors special relationship with juries[,] [t]he
effect of their adversarial excesses ... may be somewhat mitigated").
While defense
attorneys should generally follow the same types of rules about what is and is not proper
argument (e.g., defense counsel should not be permitted to misstate the evidence or make
explicitly racial appeals), improper argument by defense counsel is less serious. See
Alschuler, supra note 13, at 632 (asserting that the statements of defense counsel carry
comparatively little weight). Arguments by prosecutors but not defense counsel bear the
imprimatur of the state. Id. And prosecutors but not defense counsel have a wider
responsibility to pursue justice, not just victories for their clients.
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even though very few cases actually go to trial and other types of
prosecutorial misconduct may be even more common. 138 "The
credibility of the justice system is on the line, and thus courts need
to identify procedures for determining whether the argument
appeals to improper prejudice and then determine what to do
about it."139
III. JURIES ARE LIKELY AFFECTED BY PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT MORE THAN CURRENTLY RECOGNIZED

Current appellate case law fails to adequately reflect the extent
to which this misconduct likely affects jurors. 'Much research
indicates that jurors, like all decision makers, may be affected by
factors they do not mention or even perceive to have influenced
them." 140 This section begins by explaining how jurors likely make
decisions in individual cases, using the well-accepted story model,
as supplemented by current research on coherence-based
reasoning. It then talks about how these models of juror
decisionmaking leave room for cognitive biases (including
confirmation bias) to affect juror decisionmaking in ways that
jurors likely would not recognize, and how prosecutorial trial
misconduct may exploit this potential for bias in ways that would
be hard to detect.
A. MODELS OF JURY DECISIONMAKING: THE STORY MODEL AND
COHERENCE-BASED REASONING

According to the story model of juror decisionmaking, which is
well-accepted in both the psychological and legal literature, jurors
use story construction to understand and interpret the information

138 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 117, at 32-33 (describing the breadth of prosecutorial
misconduct and lamenting that this misconduct is difficult to discover).
39Lyon, supra note 69, at 335.
140 Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 17, 24 (1996). The discussion in this section should not be read to mean that
all jury decisionmaking involves reliance on biases; instead, this section is intended to
explain how jury decisions can be more influenced by biases than either jurors or reviewing
courts recognize.
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they receive throughout a criminal trial.141 According to the story
model, the key cognitive task for jurors deciding a case is not the
mathematical estimation of probabilities about what occurred, but
instead is the construction of stories to explain the evidence.14 2 To
do so, jurors use a three-step process: (1) they evaluate evidence
through the construction of multiple stories that could explain the
evidence; (2) they learn about the legal standards for the various
verdicts they could reach; and (3) they decide on the appropriate
verdicts by classifying the most likely story into the best-fitting
143
verdict option.
The first step, story construction, is crucial, because "one
central claim of the model is that the story the juror constructs
determines the juror's decision." 1
According to this model,
individual jurors usually construct multiple stories rather than
just a single story.1 45 To decide between the competing stories,
"jurors rely on coverage (whether the story can accommodate all
the evidence), coherence (whether the story makes sense), and
1 46 If
uniqueness (whether there are other plausible explanations)."
a single story accounts for all of the evidence and arguments and
makes strong sense to the juror, then the juror will have a high
degree of confidence that the story is correct; on the other hand, if
141 See, e.g., Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 547, 552 (2013) ("The well-confirmed model of jury behavior-the Story Model-posits
that legal fact finders assimilate evidence into competing narratives of the events and select
the most plausible or satisfying of the available accounts.").
142 See Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 293 (2013)
("Experimental research has yielded the insight that jurors do not, by and large, estimate
probabilities when determining the events that transpired in a case; rather, they draw
conclusions based on whether information assembles into plausible narratives."); Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model,
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 520 (1991) ("We call our theory the Story Model because we
propose that a central cognitive process in juror decision making is story construction.").
143 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 142, at 520-21. Professor Hastie explains the threestep process more clearly in a later article: "Applications of the Story Model to criminal jury
judgments have identified three component processes: (1) evidence evaluation through story
construction, (2) representation of the decision alternatives (verdicts) by learning their
attributes or elements, and (3) reaching a decision through the classification of the story
into the best-fitting verdict category." Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors' Decisions, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 991, 995 (2001).
144 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 142, at 521.
145 Id. at 527.
146 Griffin, supra note 142, at 293.
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multiple explanations seem plausible, or if even the "best" story
does not account for all of the evidence or make sense to the
individual juror, then the juror will be less confident in selecting
147
the best story.
While the story model began as an explanation for individual
decisionmaking, more recent scholarship connects the story model
to empirical research on the group dynamics involved in jury
deliberations. 148 Studies on how juries deliberate together have
shown "that juries try to reconcile their individual narratives and
arrive at a consistent story they can all agree on. The process is a
combination of rational persuasion, sheer social pressure, and the
psychological mechanism by which individual perceptions undergo
change when exposed to group discussion. 149 Other research
suggests that when lawyers can persuade the majority of jurors to
accept their story of what happened, they are likely to obtain a
1 50
verdict in their client's favor.
Similarly, research into coherence-based reasoning shows that
decisionmakers do not use mathematical computations of
individual pieces of information, but instead make decisions based
on "constructed representations of coherence." 151 Coherence-based
research is therefore consistent with the story model, but goes
beyond that model to account for decisions that are not well-suited
to narrative structures, such as decisions about the extent of
damages or culpability for failing to appreciate a risk.1 52 The
theory of coherence-based reasoning suggests that when
Pennington & Hastie, supranote 142, at 527-28.
Griffin, supra note 142, at 327.
(quoting NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 137
149 Id.
(2007); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 489 (1966)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
150 See Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial Procedure and the Story Model, 13
CARDOzO L. REV. 559, 561 (1991) (describing a study indicating that jurors are more likely
to return guilty verdicts when the state's evidence is presented as a story).
151 Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box. Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making, 71 U. CI. L. REV. 511, 563 (2004). "Coherence-based reasoning applies to mental
tasks in which the person must make a discrete decision or judgment in the face of
complexity. Tasks are said to be complex when their constitutive considerations are
numerous, contradictory, ambiguous, and incommensurate." Id. at 516. Simon notes that
most legal cases that are litigated and appealed are complex in this way and therefore are
likely to be resolved through coherence-based reasoning. Id.
152 Id. at 563-64.
147
148
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decisionmakers are faced with complex information that suggests
different alternatives, they reinterpret the information: "[T]he
mental representation of the considerations undergoes gradual
change and ultimately shifts toward a state of coherence with
either one of the decision alternatives."'1 53
Through this
reinterpretation process, the decisionmaker's assessment of the
case goes from hard to easy, and the decisionmaker becomes more
confident in the emerging decision. 15 4 "The fact that decisions are
ultimately based on skewed mental models and backed by high
levels of confidence facilitates the making of the decision, but at
the same time it can also harbor problematic implications" 155 and
''cause a substantial increase in the risk of error in certain
156
circumstances."
B. HOW PROSECUTORIAL TRIAL MISCONDUCT CAN EXPLOIT JURORS'
COGNITIVE BIASES

These theories suggest that bias may affect juror
decisionmaking as jurors draw on their own life experiences to
157
construct and select the best story or theory of coherence.
According to the story model, jurors will not only rely on the
evidence presented at trial in constructing stories, but they will
also make inferences from that evidence based on their own
58
experiences and understandings of how the world works.
"Because all jurors hear the same evidence and have the same
general knowledge about the expected structure of stories,
153Id. at 517.
154 Id.
155
156

Id.
Id. at 549.

Pennington & Hastie, supranote 142, at 525.
See id. at 527 ("Some of [the juror's] inferences may be suggested by the attorneys and
some may be constructed solely by the juror."); see also John B. Mitchell, Narrative and
Client-Centered Representation: What Is a True Believer to Do When His Two Favorite
Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 85, 116 (1999) ("[T]he 'stories' of the parties which
[jurors] compare to their own may not at all be the story the parties are putting forth, but
rather a limited tale responding only to the scope of the juror's idiosyncratic narrative.");
Stacy Caplow, The Impossible Dream Comes True-A Criminal Law Professor Becomes
Juror # 7, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 785, 810 (2002) (describing her own experience on a jury in
which the life experiences of other jurors contributed to the deliberations in ways that the
lawyers would not have anticipated).
157
1,
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differences in story construction must arise from differences in
world knowledge; that is, differences in experiences and beliefs
about the social world."' 59 Thus, the typical emphasis that lawyers
place on jury selection may well derive at least in part from
lawyers' desire to find jurors whose understandings and
experiences will lead them to draw inferences that favor the
160
lawyers' clients.
Some writers have expressed discomfort with the way that this
process can hinder jurors' evaluation of individual cases. 161 For
example, Professor Mitchell concludes that some defendants'
stories put them at inherently higher risk: "[U]nless diverse
defendants can tell their stories to the factfinders without being
saddled with credibility problems touching critical story elements
of their narratives that are due, not to the stories, but to the
schemata of the factfinders, this group of defendants cannot
receive a 'fair trial.' "162 Relatedly, Professor Griffin notes that
jurors' typical experiences may be poorly suited to help them
analyze criminal cases163: "Trials make jurors choose, and
narratives give them a false sense of completeness and closure
when they do. The selected story of 'what happened' binds to
receptors formed through a lifetime of stories. Once that bond is
formed, other ideas are suppressed ....
-164
That analysis is very similar to confirmation bias, discussed
above, in that it suggests that jurors' life experiences may make
them predisposed to view the evidence in a particular way, which
Pennington & Hastie, supranote 142, at 525.
See Todd E. Pettys, The Emotional Juror, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1609, 1629-30 (2007)
('Trial lawyers widely regard the jury-selection process as critically important to the
outcome of a case.... Because one [juror's] common sense and experiences may differ
markedly from another's, different [jurors] may reach very different conclusions about the
importance and implications of the same items of evidence.").
161 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 158, at 125.
162 Id.; cf. Caplow, supra note 158, at 810 (describing how jury diversity in jury
deliberations may help illuminate the weakness of a prosecution case). Caplow's discussion
provides a concrete illustration of one way in which jurors bring their own experiences into
jury deliberations in ways that lawyers would not necessarily anticipate.
163 Of course, even when jurors have more relevant background knowledge, they may use
that knowledge to make incorrect assumptions. See Caplow, supra note 158, at 819
(explaining how she made an incorrect assumption as a juror in a criminal trial, despite her
experience as a criminal law professor).
16 Griffin, supra note 142, at 312.
159
160
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in turn may shape how they process and understand the
information presented at trial. Similarly, although the story
model suggests that the stories juries create based on the evidence
develop throughout the trial, another cognitive process closely
related to confirmation bias may affect the extent to which those
stories change. While confirmation bias leads people to seek
information consistent with their hypothesis, selective information
processing leads them to "recall stored information and interpret
165
new information to conform to their pre-existing views."
"Because of selective information processing, people more readily
accept information that supports their hypothesis and find reasons
166
to discount information that runs counter to that hypothesis."
Thus, jurors may be more willing to accept prosecutorial
arguments at face value that are consistent with their preferred
1 67
stories, even when those arguments are legally improper.
Additionally, empirical research suggests another way that
jurors may be affected by confirmation bias. That research
suggests that the presumption of innocence is a legal fiction and
that many jurors actually presume that the defendant is guilty
before hearing any evidence.1 68 If so, then confirmation bias may
165 Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 183, 196 (2007) (citing Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and
Attitude Polarization:The Effects of PriorTheories on Subsequently ConsideredEvidence, 37
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979)).
166 Bowman, supra note 29, at 23. "[F]or desired conclusions ... it is as if we ask, 'Can I
believe this?' but for unpalatable conclusions we ask, 'Must I believe this?" Findley & Scott,
supra note 34, at 314 (quoting THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T So: THE
FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 84 (1991)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
167 Of course, an important counterpoint to these preexisting biases is the extent to which
jurors match their stories to the jury instructions to reach a verdict. See Hastie, supra note
143, at 997-98 (describing the research supporting this part of the process as an important
part of the story model of decisionmaking); Caplow, supra note 158, at 814 (describing her
own experiences as a juror, which show the importance of the burden of proof in her
assessment of the evidence). Caplow's experience illustrates the way that weaknesses in
the prosecution's case during the first day of trial, combined with knowledge that the
government has to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, created the hypothesis that
the defendant should be acquitted, which in turn seemed to shape the way that the jurors
listened to and interpreted the rest of the evidence presented and shaped their
deliberations. Id.
168 See Findley & Scott, supra note 34, at 340-41; see also Josephine Ross, "Hfe Looks
Guilty": Reforming Good CharacterEvidence to Undercut the Presumption of Guilt, 65 U.
PITT. L. REV. 227, 260 (2004) (noting that many jurors assume that most defendants are
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lead jurors to focus on evidence that suggests guilt and discount
evidence that undercuts that conclusion. 169 That theory is also
consistent with the research described above showing that jurors
tend to find prosecutors inherently more credible than defense
counsel, which is partly why prosecutorial vouching is so
effective. 170 Additionally, prosecutorial misconduct that involves
dehumanizing the defendant may make it easier for jurors to
conclude that the defendant deserves punishment, regardless of
the specific evidence in the trial. 71 Confirmation bias involves
unconscious processes, 172 so jurors could be influenced by
confirmation bias regarding the defendant's guilt without realizing
that they were violating the presumption of innocence.
Additionally, lawyers can influence the stories that jurors
create and accept, and they can do so in ways that minimize or
exacerbate cognitive biases. On the positive side, lawyers can use
opening statements to create an effective story framework that
provides context for the testimony that follows. 7 3 But if opening
statements improperly play on jurors' beliefs in the defendant's
guilt, that narrative can affect "what evidence is attended to, how
it is interpreted, and what is recalled both during and after the
trial."174
Lawyers can also properly use closing statements to show that
the evidence as a whole tells a compelling story and that the other
75
side's evidence or theories do not undercut the proffered story.

guilty, that a "weeding out process" exists to protect the innocent, and that prosecutors
know more than they do about the defendant's guilt).
169 See supra Part II.B (explaining how confirmation bias affects information processing).
170 See supra Part II.A.1 (highlighting arguments that rely on a prosecutor's credibility).
171 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
172 Bowman, supra note 29, at 455 nn.150-51.
173 See Lempert, supra note 150, at 564; see also Caplow, supra note 158, at 790, 795-96
(describing how both the prosecutor and defense counsel in a particular case used opening
statements to establish their theory of what happened, in a way that provided a framework
for the jury to understand the significance of some of the evidence presented at trial); id. at
821 (providing more detail on the importance of an opening statement).
174 Lempert, supra note 150, at 565.
175 See id. at 569 (summarizing several tactics that lawyers may use in their closing
statements). Pennington and Hastie's research showed that the way information was
presented could significantly affect jury verdicts. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 142,
at 542-43 (discussing the difference in verdict rates when one side presented the evidence
in story form and the other side presented the evidence chronologically). Although that
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But when prosecutors improperly vouch for their own witnesses,
attack the credibility of defense counsel, or otherwise appeal to
jury prejudices, they may improperly shape juror narratives about
the case. Furthermore, closing arguments are particularly useful
for solidifying the support of jurors already inclined in one's favor
and for providing ammunition for them to use in the jury room "so
that they can become an extension of the advocate."'176 When the
prosecutor's argument is improper, jurors may still use it as
ammunition. 177 And the inherent credibility advantage that
prosecutors generally enjoy may make jurors even more receptive
to these arguments and may make it hard for defense counsel to
78
counter such arguments.
These types of appeals might be particularly powerful during
closing arguments, as empirical research supports the common
wisdom among trial advocates about the persuasive power of

experiment did not attempt to mimic the exact ways that information is presented at trial,

see id. at 543, the experiment does support the idea that the "fit" between lawyers'
strategies and the story model could affect the way that jurors understand and evaluate
particular cases. Caplow's experiences bear out this reasoning, in that the defense counsel
effectively told the defendant's story, while the prosecutor "offer[ed] analogies and parables"
that did not resonate with the jury and failed to tell a compelling counter-story. Caplow,
supra note 158, at 822-23. Caplow then effectively described how, in that case, the
government could have told a more effective story, both in summation and in the
presentation of the evidence. Id. at 823-25.
176 H. Mitchell Caldwell et al., The Art and Architecture of ClosingArgument, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 961, 972 (2002); see also Caplow, supra note 158, at 824 ("In retrospect, the defense did
a remarkable job of weaving a story from flimsy threads pulled from the much more tightly
woven prosecution case. It might well be that the defense amounted to no more than the
'Emperor's new clothes,' illusory and insubstantial. Yet, such a story told to a more than
receptive audience, a jury heading toward acquittal, gave us the arguments we needed to
reach our verdict.").
177 See Ross, supra note 168, at 260-61 (describing how prosecutors press their credibility
advantage through dehumanizing defendants and concluding that "[t]he point is not that
prosecutors sometimes cross the line, but in understanding that these lines exist on a
continuum, where obvious illegitimate character assassination is sometimes different only
in degree from legitimate argument").
178 See id. at 260 (noting that jurors may assume that the prosecutor knows more than
them); Simon, supra note 151, at 573 ("Research on persuasion also shows that the
effectiveness of a persuasive message depends upon the target's perception of the source.
Most notably, persuasion is adversely affected when the source is deemed to lack credibility.
Thus, a juror is not likely to respond to the urging of an advocate for the disbelieved party,
especially when the juror is already close to making up her mind.").
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closing arguments on jurors. 17 9 Empirical research on the "recency
effect" suggests that people tend to remember best and be
influenced by the latest event in a sequence more than by earlier
The recency effect can be exacerbated by the
events.' 8 0
"asymmetric rebound effect," the process by which powerful
information can trigger a backlash against a strongly held
belief.'8 1 If a defense attorney has succeeded in gaining sympathy
or understanding for a defendant, and the prosecutor responds by
using inflammatory language or arguments in rebuttal, the result
may be an "asymmetric rebound effect, whereby the jurors would
become incensed that they were 'suckered' into believing that the
defendant was deserving of sympathy and of the protections of the
Bill of Rights."'18 2 That research is consistent with the empirical
research showing that exposure to "anger-provoking stimuli
increases the tendency to blame other people for ambiguous events
and to neglect alternative explanations and possible mitigating
circumstances."' 8 3 For these reasons, inflammatory prosecutorial
arguments may significantly prejudice the defendant's ability to
l8 4
receive a fair trial'
When these things happen, it may be very difficult for jurors
(and later reviewing courts) to assess whether the misconduct
affected the verdict or was instead simply harmless error. Both
the story model and coherence-based reasoning theories show that
jurors make decisions by looking at the case holistically, so that it
is impossible to judge the significance of any single piece of
85
evidence or event in the trial.
[T]he elements of the story interact in ways that alter
their individual significance: each merges with what
came before and flows into what comes after .... no

179 See Alford, supra note 79, at 513-14 (summarizing this empirical research and
describing its effect on trial strategy).
180 Id.
181 Id.

at 513.

at 515.
at 516.
183 Simon, supra note 151, at 582.
181See Alford, supra note 79, at 516 (asserting that this misconduct may prejudice
defendants more than adverse pretrial publicity).
186 See supraPart III.A.
182 Id.
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one piece of evidence can be assessed in isolation,
and ... new pieces color both the information already
before the jury and the testimony to come .... ,"186
Similarly, under coherence-based reasoning theory, the process of
making a decision changes the way that the decisionmaker
evaluates the various pieces of information.1 8 7
It therefore
becomes impossible to separate out the significance of any one
piece of information from its effect on the overall decision.
Thus, these theories suggest that jurors make decisions in ways
that leave them open to being affected by cognitive biases, that
prosecutorial trial misconduct can exploit these biases, and that it
may be virtually impossible to assess the impact of a single piece
of information on the ultimate conclusion that is reached.
IV. APPELLATE COURTS CURRENTLY FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE
REMEDIES BECAUSE OF OVERRELIANCE ON PROCEDURAL
DOCTRINES

Appellate courts fail to adequately recognize the likely influence
of cognitive biases on prosecutors committing misconduct or the
way that such misconduct may subconsciously affect jurors'
decisions. This failure derives in part from the structure of
appellate court review and in part from cognitive biases affecting
appellate judges.
A. PROBLEMS WITH THE PROCEDURES USED IN APPELLATE REVIEW

Formally, courts often use a two-step analysis for prosecutorial
misconduct claims, determining first "whether the conduct, viewed
objectively, was improper," and then "whether the probable impact
of that conduct prejudiced the verdict."1 88 In other words, courts
186 Griffin, supra note 142, at 286; see also Simon, supra note 151, at 564 ("[C]oherencebased reasoning provides a deeper theoretical explanation of holistic processing...."); id.
("while narrative structures might not be essential for holistic processing, coherence shifts
are likely to be particularly pronounced in their presence.").
187 Simon, supra note 151, at 522-23, 537. For example, in one experiment, changes to
information about the defendant's character affected participants' views "on the
appropriateness of regulating free speech over the Internet." Id. at 537-38.
1ss Gershman, supra note 7, at 133.
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typically first determine whether prosecutorial misconduct
actually occurred, and if so, then courts ask whether that
misconduct was harmless error. That two-step process assumes,
however, that defense counsel objected at trial to the alleged
misconduct; if not, then courts also consider how the failure to
18 9
object affects the analysis.
In practice, however, the procedural issues (whether the error
was properly preserved and whether any error was harmless) in
prosecutorial misconduct cases often overwhelm the analysis of
whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred at all:
The question in a given case may be not whether the
prosecutor's conduct was erroneous, but whether the
error was so clear that an appellate court could
consider it despite the absence of an objection at trial,
whether the effect of the error was minimized or
eliminated by the subsequent action of the court or
prosecutor, or whether the error was serious enough to
affect the integrity of the verdict. 190
As a result of these procedural issues, court decisions are often
unpredictable, and cases often lack significant precedential
value. 191 And even when courts do declare conduct to be improper,
192
they usually fail to provide any meaningful remedy.
189 See infra Part IV.A.2. This Article focuses on the standards and procedures employed on
direct review, rather than the standards used for habeas corpus review. For a discussion of
the latter type of challenges to prosecutorial misconduct, see generally Alford, supra note 79.
190 Alschuler, supra note 13, at 638.
191 See id. ('The sense that most clearly emerges from the decisions is that of
unpredictability. Cases proceed on an ad hoc basis, and results do not follow a consistent
pattern. Even if the alleged misconduct in one case seems similar to the alleged misconduct
in another, the procedural context is invariably different. The force of precedent is
therefore slight. The courts seem to enjoy an almost total freedom to reach any result on
any given set of facts."); see also Dustin D. Berger, Moving Toward Law: Refocusing the
Federal Courts'PlainErrorDoctrine in Criminal Cases, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 526 (2013)
(noting that decisions applying the plain error doctrine "do little to help future courts or
defendants in deciding what kinds and levels of prosecutorial misconduct are sufficiently
serious to warrant a remedy," and arguing that courts should take a more precedent-based
approach to harmless error in prosecutorial misconduct cases).
192 See, e.g., Brian C. Duffy, Note, Barring Foul Blows: An Argument for a Per Se
Reversible-ErrorRule for Prosecutors'Use of Religious Arguments in the Sentencing Phase of
Capital Cases, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1335, 1344-45 (1997) (explaining that although courts may
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This section explains the doctrines of harmless error and
preservation of error, showing how the current application of these
doctrines in prosecutorial misconduct cases poses significant
problems.
These problems include muddying the courts'
determinations of whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred,
failing to provide adequate remedies for misconduct, and
undercutting the courts' ostensible message against prosecutors
engaging in such behavior. The discussion below starts with
harmless error because that doctrine is a more common basis for
193
courts' decisions, and then moves on to preservation of error.
1. Courts Rely Too Heavily on Harmless Error to Uphold
Convictions. "[H]armless error is a doctrine born of the belief that
some errors are created more equal than others and that the
simple finding of error is not always a sufficient ground to justify
the reversal of an otherwise valid conviction."'194 Courts sometimes
conclude that an error occurred but that the error was harmless;
in other cases, courts refuse to decide whether or not an error
occurred at all because even if there was an error, the error was
harmless. 195 Although harmless error analysis is a fairly recent
development in criminal law, 196 its use has been greatly expanded
over the last fifty years, so that it now may be the most cited rule
offer "rhetorical flair" in condemning prosecutorial behavior, they almost always rely on
contextual factors to conclude that any error was harmless).
193 See, e.g., Ghetti & Killebrew, supra note 21, at 353 (summarizing one study showing
that, in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct, appellate courts rely much more
frequently on harmless error than preservation of error in refusing to reverse).
194 Sam Kamin, HarmlessError and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2002).
195 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error,'30J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 184
(2001) ("In 87 percent of the cases, the errors were held to be harmless-in 45 percent the
appellate court found errors but held that they were harmless and in another 42 percent the
court concluded that even if there was an error (which the court did not decide) it was
harmless.").
196 Kamin, supra note 194, at 10. Until 1919, U.S. courts followed the English rule and
required reversal for "any error of substance," whether constitutional or statutory. Id.
Between 1919 and 1967, errors of constitutional magnitude remained grounds for per se
reversal, while non-constitutional errors were subject to harmless error analysis. Id. Then,
in 1967, the Supreme Court first applied harmless error analysis to constitutional errors, in
Chapman v. California,386 U.S. 18 (1967), a case involving prosecutorial misconduct. See
Kamin, supra note 194, at 11-12 (discussing Chapman, where the Court analyzed the
prosecutor's comments on the defendant's failure to testify). In Chapman, the Court for the
first time said that a constitutional error could be deemed harmless, but the state would
have the burden of proving harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 11.
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in criminal appeals. 197 During this time frame, courts have greatly
expanded the types of errors subject to harmless error analysis
and have reduced the prosecution's burden of demonstrating
harmlessness.

198

The primary justifications offered for expanded use of harmless
error analysis involve protecting the finality of the trial result and
avoiding the costs associated with a second trial that would lead to
the same result. 199 Retrial costs extend beyond monetary costs to
the time and energy involved and the psychological costs to victims
who must relive their disturbing experiences. 20 0 The Supreme
Court has noted that these societal costs are justified "when an
error in the first proceeding has deprived a defendant of a fair
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence[, but] the balance
of interest tips decidedly the other way when an error has had no
20 1
effect on the outcome of the trial."
The courts use a variety of standards to measure whether an
error was harmless. 20 2 "On direct review in the federal courts,
'[t]he standard for determining if a non-constitutional error is
harmless is... whether the error had substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' "203 For
constitutional errors, on the other hand, the prosecution must
20 4
show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The standards vary even more widely in state courts. Some states

197 Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 161.
198 Id. at 172.

199Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error,ProsecutorialMisconduct, and Due Process:
There's More to Due Process than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1298, 1301 (1988).
200 United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986).
201 Id.
202 See Jason M. Solomon, Causing ConstitutionalHarm:How Tort Law Can Help Determine
Harmless Error in Criminal Trials, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1053, 1061 (2005) (describing the many
different formulations that the Court offered of harmless error analysis in cases decided in the
1990s). This Article focuses on the standards that apply to direct review of convictions, rather
than the standards that apply to habeas review. For a discussion of the standards that apply
in habeas cases, see, e.g., Duffy, supranote 192, at 1342-44. For purposes of this discussion, I
have also set aside how preservation of error concerns (such as the failure to raise a timely
objection or ask for a mistrial) affects appellate review of harmless error analysis. That issue
is discussed in more detail infra in Part IV.A.2.
203 Lyon, supranote 69, at 321 (quoting Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Harmless ErrorReview in
the Second Circuit, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 395, 399 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
204 Id. at 322. That standard comes from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
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apply the constitutional/non-constitutional error distinction, while
other states only use the non-constitutional standard that requires
the defendant to prove prejudice. 20 5 Additionally, some courts
apply the constitutional harmless error standard when a specific
constitutional right is implicated but not for violations of the
20 6
general right to a fair trial.
The choice between the constitutional and non-constitutional
standard is at least theoretically a very important one, as the
constitutional harmless error standard requires the prosecutor to
prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than
requiring the defendant to affirmatively prove prejudice. 20 7 Yet
courts may not always be following Supreme Court precedent
about who should have the burden of showing whether an error
was harmless. 208 Furthermore, some commentators suggest that
who has the burden of showing harmless error rarely affects the
20 9
court's decision about whether an error is harmless.
Regardless of how the burden of proof is allocated, the courts
generally take one of two approaches in determining harmless
error. 210 Under the error-based approach, courts examine whether
the particular error likely affected the outcome in the particular
trial. 211 By contrast, under the guilt-focused approach, the courts
imagine a hypothetical trial without the error and ask whether
212
there was still enough evidence of guilt to affirm the conviction.
205 Lyon, supra note 69, at 323-24; see also Alschuler, supra note 13, at 664 (discussing
the "bewildering variety of state standards" that apply in cases of non-constitutional
harmless error analysis).
206 See, e.g., Krista L. Nelson & Jacob J. Stender, "Like Wolves in Sheep's Clothing":
Combating Racial Bias in Washington State's Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 849, 854 (2012) (asserting that "[c]ourts apply this standard when constitutional rights
other than the right to a fair trial are impacted by the prosecutor's actions").
207 See id. at 853-54 (discussing the formulations of these standards by Washington
courts). The point about who bears the burden holds for the federal formulations of the
standards as well.
208 See Solomon, supra note 202, at 1068 (describing his empirical study of harmless error
analysis in federal habeas cases, in which "more than one in four improperly placed the
burden on the petitioner").
209 See Findley & Scott, supra note 34, at 321. Additionally, Professor Landes and Judge
Posner criticize the distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional error. Landes
& Posner, supra note 195, at 172.
210 Solomon, supra note 202, at 1062.
211

Id.

212

Id.
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One empirical study suggests that the difference between the two
approaches significantly affects case outcomes: "[Alnalyses where
a guilt-based approach was used by the court during its analysis
found the error harmless 93% of the time, while those using an
error-based approach found the error harmless only 47% of the
213

time."

Under either of these approaches, the courts generally look to a
variety of factors in analyzing harmless error. Many courts
consider whether the misconduct was severe, whether the trial
court took corrective actions such as instructing the jury to
disregard the misconduct, and whether the remaining evidence
against the defendant was strong. 214 Courts sometimes also look
at other factors, including whether the misconduct was invited by
the other side and whether the misconduct was an isolated
215
instance or was repeated throughout the trial.
Given the doctrinal morass described above, it should be no
surprise that the harmless error doctrine has been extensively
criticized. Some commentators criticize the excessive malleability
of the factors used in harmless error analysis, 2 16 noting that courts
sometimes rely on precisely the same factor to reach opposite
conclusions. 21 7 Professor Kamin notes the impossibility of a
Id. at 1071.
See Joy, supra note 127, at 426 n.137 (collecting cases discussing these factors). This
approach is consistent with the iconic prosecutorial misconduct case discussed at the
beginning of this Article, Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). In Berger, the
Court concluded that it was "highly probable" that the misconduct affected the verdict
because that misconduct was "pronounced and persistent" rather than "slight or confined to
a single instance," see id. at 89; the trial court's response to the misconduct was not forceful,
see id. at 85; and the remaining case against the defendant was weak, see id. at 88.
215 See Bazelon, supra note 5, at 423 (discussing the "invited response rule," which considers
whether the defense counsel provoked the improper comments). Occasionally, courts also
consider the length of the jury's deliberations and whether the jury acquitted the defendant of
some charges or acquitted some co-defendants. See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 659.
216 See, e.g., Kamin, supra note 194, at 7 (pointing out the malleability of harmless error
analysis, based on his review of nearly 300 California Supreme Court decisions in death
penalty cases, in which more than 90% of death sentences were upheld on appeal even
though the courts found constitutional error in almost all cases).
217 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 13, at 659 (observing that courts sometimes conclude that
an error was harmless in part because long deliberations show that the jury was careful, while
in other cases courts use long deliberations as evidence that the case was extremely close such
that the error was not harmless); see also id. at 659-60 (asserting that courts sometimes rely
on factors that have no logical relevance to whether the error was harmless).
213
214
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reviewing court being able to "unring a bell that has already rung"
by mentally "travel[ing] back in time and imagin[ing] a world that
never was" (how the case would have gone without the error); he
argues that the courts' harmless error conclusions "can be no
better than science fiction."218 Other commentators criticize the
doctrine in terms of its ineffectiveness in reaching errors that
probably really did affect the outcome in particular cases. For
example, Professor Cicchini argues that the concept of harmless
error is fundamentally flawed, in that evidence shows that judges
are ineffective at evaluating what matters to juries in particular
cases, and in fact judges simply use their discretion under
harmless error analysis to preserve convictions. 219
The empirical research into wrongful conviction cases bears out
these criticisms. For example, a study of the first 200 DNA
exonerations revealed that half of the courts upholding the
convictions of people who turned out to be innocent referred to the
likely guilt of the defendant, and in nearly a third of the cases, the
courts specifically relied on harmless error analysis in upholding
the convictions. 220 A similar study showed that in nearly 30% of
DNA exonerations, appellate courts had relied on harmless error
in upholding convictions prior to the discovery of the DNA
221
evidence.
Furthermore, the courts' routine reliance on harmless error in
prosecutorial misconduct cases "strongly suggests that the courts
do not care very much about prosecutorial misconduct." 222
Professor Bennett Gershman labels the harmless error rule "a
Kamin, supra note 194, at 21.
Cicchini, supra note 23, at 347.
220 See Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions:Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 934-35 (2011-2012) (summarizing the results of the study and
noting the courts' skepticism of the innocence of improperly convicted defendants); see also
id. at 935 ("Judges simply cannot be expected to recognize or zealously pursue facts
supporting claims of innocence when they objectively view the likelihood of innocence to be
so remote; only zealous advocates can be expected to push for such evidence and such a
perspective.").
221 See Johns, supra note 20, at 518 (noting that of sixty-five cases, nineteen involved
conclusions that misconduct had occurred but was harmless). The courts in thirty-four of
the sixty-five cases found that no misconduct occurred; in only twelve cases did the courts
accept the existence of misconduct and conclude that this misconduct was not harmless. Id.
All sixty-five people were actually innocent. Id.
222 Alschuler, supra note 13, at 660.
218
219
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jurisprudential fiasco" and notes that "it tacitly informs
prosecutors that they can weigh the commission of evidentiary or
procedural violations not against a legal or ethical standard of
appropriate conduct, but rather, against an increasingly accurate
prediction that the appellate courts will ignore the misconduct
223
when sufficient evidence exists to prove the defendant's guilt."
Similarly, Professor Angela Davis notes that the harmless error
rule "permits, perhaps even unintentionally encourages,
prosecutors to engage in misconduct during trial with the
assurance that so long as the evidence of the defendant's guilt is
clear, the conviction will be affirmed." 224 Others note with concern
that courts rely on harmless error analysis to excuse even serious
and pervasive misconduct. 225 This system creates little incentive
for prosecutors to change their behavior and avoid making
improper comments 226 because future prosecutors committing the
same impropriety in a later case that was held to be misconduct in
an earlier one are no more likely than the prosecutor in the first
227
case to see any meaningful consequences from the misconduct.
Then-Judge Jerome Frank may have summed it up best when he
noted that courts "breed[] a deplorably cynical attitude towards
the judiciary" when they adopt "an attitude of helpless piety" by
using "vigorous language in denouncing" prosecutors' conduct, but
228
refuse to reverse the resulting convictions.
2. The Plain Error Doctrine Exacerbates this Problem by
Muddying the Lines Between Whether Misconduct Occurred and
Whether it Affected the Outcome. The other major procedural
Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 425 (1992).
DAVIS, supranote 6, at 127.
225 See, e.g., Johns, supra note 20, at 517 (asserting that harmless error cases are often
associated with serious prosecutorial misconduct); Alschuler, supra note 13, at 660 (noting
that application of the harmless error doctrine is not confined to minor instances of
prosecutorial misconduct).
226 Kamin, supra note 194, at 15 (arguing that the use of harmless error analysis as
currently formulated in prosecutorial misconduct cases means that these cases "merely
inform[ ] prosecutors what they may and may not do without giving them any real incentive
to change their behaviors").
227 Id.
at 56-61 (contrasting the courts' approaches to harmless error with their
approaches to qualified immunity and retroactivity, and arguing that the latter two
doctrines have significantly more of a future deterrent effect than harmless error analysis).
228 United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946).
222

224
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doctrine that interferes with the courts' treatment of prosecutorial
trial misconduct involves the plain error doctrine, which limits
appellate review of errors that were not objected to at trial. "It is
well settled that a contemporaneous objection is generally required
in order to preserve any error on appeal claiming improper closing
argument." 229 When there is no objection at trial, then courts
apply the plain error rule to determine whether they should
review the alleged error, and if so, how to analyze it. In
prosecutorial misconduct cases, when defense counsel fails to
object to a statement at trial, this failure to object makes it
significantly harder to convince an appellate court that the
behavior was misconduct that justifies reversal.
The plain error rule applies in all federal and many state
appellate courts. 230 In federal courts, when a timely objection was
made at trial, then under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
52(a), the government has the burden of showing on appeal that
the error did not prejudice the defendant. 231 On the other hand,
when there was no objection, then on appeal the defendant must
show plain error, which requires both that the error was clearly
contrary to law and that the error was so prejudicial that it denied
the defendant's right to a fair trial. 232 Some states take related
but slightly different approaches. 23 3 For example, some state
courts treat the failure to object at trial as a waiver of the issue on
appeal, i.e., a reason to refuse to determine whether there was
error at all, rather than whether the error affected the outcome. 23 4
229 Montz, supra note 37, at 76. Unlike harmless error, which is a relatively new doctrine,
the doctrine of plain error has existed in various forms for nearly 120 years. See Tory A.
Weigand, Raise or Lose: Appellate Discretion and PrincipledDecision-Making, 17 SUFFOLK
J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 179, 193 (2012) (" '[1]f a plain error was committed in a matter so
absolutely vital to defendants, we feel ourselves at liberty to correct it' even though no
exception was made to the error at trial." (quoting Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632,
658 (1896))).
230 Morrow & Larson, supra note 5, at 355-56.
231 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
232 Morrow & Larson, supra note 5, at 355-56. Even when these showings are made, the
court still has discretion over whether to remedy the unpreserved error. Berger, supra note
191, at 537.
233 See Weigand, supra note 229, at 230-42 (detailing many state variations in plain error
analysis generally, without focusing on prosecutorial misconduct cases).
231 See, e.g., State v. Fisher, 202 P.3d 937, 947 (Wash. 2009) ("Defense counsel's failure to
object to the misconduct at trial constitutes waiver on appeal unless the misconduct is 'so
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This waiver, however, is generally not absolute; most courts will
still review the question of whether the prosecutor committed
misconduct, even if no objection was made, in limited
circumstances. 235 For example, in Washington, courts will review
the allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, notwithstanding the
failure to object, if "the misconduct is 'so flagrant and illintentioned that it evinces an enduring and resulting prejudice'
incurable by a jury instruction."236
This "flagrant and illintentioned" standard blurs several related concepts from
prosecutorial misconduct analysis: (1) it still uses the concept of
"misconduct," which has to do with whether there was an error; (2)
it brings in harmless error ideas by talking about whether there
was prejudice and whether that prejudice was curable; and (3) it
adds a new concept not typically covered in prosecutorial
misconduct by referencing prosecutorial intent through the
flagrant and ill-intentioned language. 237 This blurring of concepts
is not limited to jurisdictions that use the flagrant and illintentioned standard, as typical plain error analysis includes both
questions of whether there was error (was it plain, i.e., clearly
contrary to law) and whether any error was harmless (which
requires the defendant to bear the burden of proving prejudice). 238
Many courts and commentators rely on both efficiency and
fairness arguments to justify the plain error doctrine. 239 For
flagrant and ill-intentioned that it evinces an enduring and resulting prejudice' incurable by
a jury instruction." (quoting State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201, 1244 (2006))). It would
probably be more precise to use the word "forfeiture" rather than "waiver" in this context, as
the failure to object is usually inadvertent rather than a knowing relinquishment of a
known right. See Weigand, supra note 229, at 182-83 (stating that waiver involves
intentionally giving up a right, whereas forfeiture arises through neglect).
235 See 108 A.L.R. 756 ("A comprehensive search much broader in scope than the
annotation clearly indicates that in only one jurisdiction ... is a motion for mistrial [or
other objection] always essential in order to insure review, upon appeal, of improper
remarks of counsel made during the trial or argument of a case.").
236 Fisher, 202 P.3d at 947 (quoting Gregory, 147 P.3d at 1244).
237 See Gershman, supra note 7, at 133 (asserting that courts generally do not consider
intent in determining whether the conduct was improper).
238 See Morrow & Larson, supra note 5, at 355-56 (noting that most state courts ask
whether the error was plain, and if so, whether it denied the defendant a fair trial).
239 See Derrick Augustus Carter, A Restatement of Exceptions to the Preservationof Error
Requirement in Criminal Cases, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 947, 950 (1998) (summarizing various
rationales for requiring preservation of error, including rationales advancing both efficiency
and fairness concerns).
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example, they stress that defense counsel's timely objection gives
the trial court the opportunity to remedy the misconduct
immediately, such as by admonishing counsel against making
improper arguments and instructing the jury to disregard the
improper remarks. 240 Similarly, some writers have emphasized
the role that the plain error doctrine plays in maintaining judicial
impartiality, arguing that the burden should be on defense counsel
rather than trial court judges to identify prosecutorial misconduct
2 41
as it happens and urge any necessary corrective measures.
Additionally, proponents of the plain error rule have expressed
concerns about defense attorney gamesmanship, arguing that the
plain error rule is necessary to prevent defense counsel from
deliberately failing to object when "she believe[s] her case [is]
going badly and the appellate court [will] award a new trial on
appeal."242 Therefore, proponents of this doctrine often approve of
the extremely low rates of reversal in appellate cases in which
trial counsel failed to object. 243 For example, Professor Montz
argues that defense counsel's failure to object demonstrates that
244
the prosecutorial comment must not have been very prejudicial.
On the other hand, a number of commentators have criticized the
plain error doctrine generally and, in particular, its application in
prosecutorial trial misconduct cases. Some commentators criticize

240 See, e.g., Montz, supra note 37, at 75, 78 (recognizing that a timely objection allows
courts to take these steps); Alschuler, supranote 13, at 648 (same).
241 See Morrow & Larson, supra note 5, at 390-92 (contending that judges are unlikely to
intervene sua sponte because they are more concerned with maintaining impartiality).
242 Id. at 388; see also Alschuler, supra note 13, at 648 ("[Tlhere is the moral notion that
the defendant should not be allowed to 'ride the verdict'; he should not be able to have a
conviction set aside on the basis of secret, 'hip-pocket' error while he can retain the benefit
of a verdict of acquittal.").
243 See, e.g., Montz, supra note 37, at 81 ("[R]elief should rarely be granted on the
assertion of plain error to matters contained in closing argument, for trial strategy looms as
an important consideration and such assertions are 'generally denied without explication.'"
(quoting State v. Wood, 719 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Mo. 1986) (en banc))).
244 See id. at 80 (calling this "the irreducible paradox of appealing an unobjected-to but
improper comment: how can the comment during closing be so egregious and inflammatory
to warrant a new trial in light of the fact counsel failed to object to it during trial in the first
place? In fact, it has been observed that the absence of objection by defense counsel during
or after argument may provide some guidance as to whether a particular argument was
prejudicial in the circumstances.").
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the oft-repeated notion of defense attorney gamesmanship. 245 For
example, Professor Laura Bazelon notes that "counsel's ability to
spot and call out this type of misconduct does not depend [upon
thorough preparation]. Rather, it depends upon knowledge of the
relevant case law, careful attention to the word choice of one's
opponent, and the confidence necessary to make this type of
objection." 246 If appellate courts have difficulty drawing clear lines
between proper and improper comments even after a careful review
of a written record of the prosecutor's comments and the other
evidence produced at trial, 247 then it is even more difficult for
defense counsel to quickly identify the problem and raise an
objection in seconds at trial. 248 Even if defense counsel is troubled
by the prosecutor's comments, these conditions make it difficult for
defense counsel to articulate their objections quickly. 249 One author
even suggested that "[i]f a trial attorney's attention is on preserving
issues for appeal, then, psychologically speaking, the attorney has
'250
already lost the trial.

245 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 239, at 951 ("[T]he trial attorney is frequently inattentive,
negligent, or inexperienced. Nothing is gained from sandbagging, except a disparaged
reputation or an attorney grievance claim.").
246 Bazelon, supra note 5, at 424. She also argues that law school clinics should train
students in detail about the lines between proper and improper prosecutorial comments so
that those students will be more able to pick up on the need for objecting at trial. Id.
247 See supra Part II.A (explaining the difficult line-drawing on what does and does not
constitute misconduct).
248 See Sullivan, supra note 57, at 215 (noting how little time defense counsel has to
consider the many issues raised by improper prosecutorial comments).
249 Bazelon provides a great description of her first-hand experience with this situation
when she was a young lawyer:
But what I remember best is the feeling I had when I heard the prosecutor
ask the jury to infer my client's guilt based on a premise the prosecutor
knew to be false. I froze, unsure what to do.... [W]hile I knew in my gut
that this case was exceptional because the prosecutor's remarks were
improper, I was too inexperienced and flustered to grasp, in the moment,
why the remarks were improper or how to explain my position. I believed
then, and continue to believe now, that the exposure of the prosecutor's
conduct and the judge's remedial measures were key turning points in the
case. But had my supervisor not elbowed me in the ribs, I doubt I would
have objected at all, an unsettling realization that underscores the
importance of educating and training future lawyers in how to respond
appropriately to prosecutorial misconduct.
Bazelon, supra note 5, at 394.
250 Carter, supra note 239, at 951.
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Even if defense counsel does pick up quickly enough on the
impropriety of the prosecutor's remarks, she has to deal with other
considerations that weigh against a decision to object. After all,
the conventional wisdom within the field of trial advocacy is that
attorneys should not object during closing arguments "unless
things are terrible."251 Defense counsel may be concerned about
maintaining good relationships with prosecutors, which can be
important for her ability to advocate successfully for future
clients. 252 Additionally, counsel may be concerned about irritating
the judge or jury by interrupting opposing counsel, 253 which can
heighten jurors' general tendencies to favor prosecutors over
defense counsel. 25 4 More specifically, defense counsel may be
concerned about the jury's likely reaction if her objection is
overruled. 255 A trial court decision to overrule an objection to
improper prosecutorial misconduct may actually encourage the
jury to rely on those comments, although appellate courts rarely
recognize that type of prejudice. 256 Additionally, courts and some
251

KENNEY F. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILLS IN A NUTSHELL 199 (2d ed. 1994); see

also id. (acknowledging "an unspoken convention that it's not nice to object during your
opponent's opening or closing unless things are terrible" (emphasis omitted)).
252 Bazelon, supra note 5, at 426. Bazelon also raises interesting questions about whether
the type of crime (e.g., sexual abuse of a minor) might not only make the prosecutor more
likely to resort to improper argument, but also might make defense counsel less likely to
object. Id. at 430.
253 See Carter, supra note 239, at 951 (cautioning that the attorney who objects frequently
may "become a pest to the judge"); see also Alschuler, supra note 13, at 648 (arguing that
requiring an objection in prosecutorial misconduct cases is particularly problematic, in part
because "a jury is likely to resent repeated objections, and objection during an attorney's
closing argument often seems especially impolite").
254 Diamond et al., supra note 140, at 44 (describing research that suggests that jurors
rate prosecutors' opening statements as more effective and organized than those of defense
attorneys).
255 WILLIAM F.X. GEOGHAN JR., THE PLAINTIFF'S APPROACH ON CLOSING ARGUMENT, ON

PERSUASION: THE KEY TO SUCCESS ON TRLAI 68 (Grace W. Holmes ed., 1992) ("Nothing is so
devastating as to have the court say, 'Well, Mr. Geoghan, there is a certain leeway allowed
in summation; your objection is overruled.' ").
256 Sullivan, supra note 57, at 247 ("One aspect of the objection process often apparently
ignored by the appellate courts is the prejudice which may result when the trial court
overrules a proper objection or mistrial motion and permits the prosecution to continue an
impermissible line of argument."). Sullivan describes the reasoning from an Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision, and further explains that:
[tihe prejudice inherent in the trial court's error in overruling defense
counsel's timely and correct objection lies in the fact that the jury may
ultimately reach its verdict or sentencing verdict based upon the improper
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commentators overstate the value of a trial court's decision to
sustain an objection to prosecutorial trial misconduct. In fact, the
misconduct may still prejudice the defendant: "[T]he defense
attorney's complaint, even if sustained by the court, may have
exactly the opposite effect from the one intended. It may call
attention to the prosecutor's improper remarks and reemphasize
them in the jurors' minds." 257 That risk is particularly acute in
prosecutorial misconduct cases, which often involve a prosecutor's
"vivid imagery" that is accessible to jurors. 258 The judge's "curative
2 59
instruction" may provide only an illusory remedy.
Therefore, defense counsel face a no-win situation when deciding
whether to object to prosecutorial trial misconduct. 260 If defense
counsel fails to object, the appellate court will only review
allegations of misconduct under the plain error standard that
muddies concepts of whether there was an error and whether it
mattered, yet if counsel does object, the court will either conclude
that the trial judge's overruling of the objection was harmless error
or that the trial judge's sustaining the objection effectively cured
any error. 26 1
B. THESE PROCEDURAL DOCTRINES ALLOW HINDSIGHT AND
OUTCOME BIASES TO AFFECT APPELLATE REVIEW OF PROSECUTORIAL
TRIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIMS

There are likely many causes of appellate courts' overreliance
on the procedural doctrines of harmless error and plain error, but
cognitive bias research illuminates at least some of these causes
and sets up the suggestions discussed in the next section for
reformulating those doctrines in prosecutorial trial misconduct
cases.

reasoning advanced by the prosecution, especially in light of the trial
court's apparent approval of the prosecutor's argument.
Id. at 247-48.
257 Alschuler, supra note 13, at 649.
258

259
260

Id.
Alford, supra note 38, at 337.
Alschuler, supra note 13, at 647 (noting that the plain error rule "leaves the defense

attorney effectively boxed in when it comes to an appeal, whatever the prosecutor's conduct).
261

Id.
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First, appellate courts are likely affected by hindsight bias.
Hindsight bias is the tendency for people to think that a particular
outcome (in this case the defendant's conviction at trial) was either
262
inevitable or at least more likely to occur than it really was.
Thus, hindsight bias means that when a judge knows that a
defendant was convicted, the judge is more likely to think that the
conviction was more inevitable than it really was.263 Hindsight
bias is particularly dangerous on appeal because of a "base rate
problem": appellate judges only see cases in which the defendant
was convicted at trial because the prosecution cannot appeal
acquittals, so "[e]very criminal defendant that appellate judges see
is guilty, a convicted criminal before the law. '264 Therefore,
appellate judges may be inclined to overestimate the likelihood of
that conviction and underestimate the potential impact of errors
like prosecutorial misconduct.
Closely related is the idea of outcome bias. Outcome bias refers
to the way that we judge a decision as good or bad in hindsight,
based on what we know about the outcome of the decision. 265 For
example, subjects in one study more often rated a decision to
perform surgery as a good one when told that the patient survived
the surgery than when told that the patient died. 266
This
reasoning, while intuitively understandable, is flawed because
information about what happened after a decision was made
cannot help us learn to make better decisions later "unless the
decision maker is clairvoyant." 267
Together, hindsight and
outcome biases lead to overreliance on harmless error because
they make convictions seem both inevitable and correct: "With
hindsight knowledge that a jury found the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, judges are likely to be predisposed to view the

263

Findley & Scott, supranote 34, at 317.
See Solomon, supranote 202, at 1086.

264

Id.

262

265

Findley & Scott, supra note 34, at 320.

266

Id.

267

Id. (quoting Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation,

54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 569 (1988)).
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conviction as both inevitable and a sound decision, despite a
procedural or constitutional error in the proceedings. 268
The plain error rule exacerbates this problem by making it very
hard for appellate courts to reverse based on unpreserved errors:
"Given that appellate arguments premised on unpreserved error
are likely to be common, but that the chance of success on these
arguments is quite low, appellate courts will likely develop a
cognitive bias in favor of rejecting appeals premised on
unpreserved error."269 The plain error rule also exacerbates the
problem because it encourages case-by-case decisions rather than
precedential reasoning. 270 The process of articulating precedential
reasoning may improve judicial decisionmaking, while the ability
to offer conclusory analysis of fact-specific points may make judges'
reasoning more vulnerable to leaps in logic or other reasoning
problems. 271 Research has confirmed that judges are susceptible to
these biases, and these biases "are likely reflected in the many
cases in which appellate courts have expressed confidence that
the... evidence of guilt was 'overwhelming,' even where DNA
272
later proved that the defendants were in fact innocent."
V. APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD REWORK THEIR APPROACHES TO
PROCEDURAL DOCTRINES TO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL REMEDIES FOR

PROSECUTORIAL TRIAL MISCONDUCT
While the problems identified above are daunting, cognitive bias
research suggests that changes to the procedural barriers to
prosecutorial trial misconduct claims may make a significant
difference. This Article focuses on changes to these procedural
doctrines as a way of providing greater remedies for individual
defendants who have been subjected to prosecutorial trial
misconduct. Other scholars have written extensively about more
268 Id. at 321; see also Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact
Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 2 (applying similar
reasoning to judicial review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
269 Berger, supra note 191, at 541.
270 Id. at 541-42.
271 Id. at 542.
272 Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591,

606 (2009).
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systemic remedies, 273 and while some of their proposed approaches
may well be very valuable and complementary to the solutions
proposed in this Article, I have chosen instead to focus more on
remedies in individual cases. "The relief granted for prosecutorial
misconduct should redress the harm suffered by the defendant
rather than merely send the government a message about the
impropriety of its conduct." 274 Furthermore, this Article focuses on
appellate rather than trial level remedies. 27 5 "[A]ppellate reversals
serve important constitutional functions by condemning the
infringement of the defendant's rights; educating police
investigators, prosecutors, and trial judges; and deterring them
from future violations." 276 Additionally, my sense is that focusing
too much on systemic remedies, without also focusing more
carefully on remedies for individual defendants, contributes to
moral disengagement and diffusion of responsibilities, perpetuating
the problems discussed in this Article. Thus, while systemic and

273 See, e.g., Joy, supra note 127, at 427 (arguing for a variety of ways to make prosecutors
more accountable for misconduct, including measures to be implemented by prosecutors'
offices, bar associations, and others); Cummings, supra note 20, at 2156-58 (proposing
several solutions, including "community prosecutors" who have responsibility for more than
just obtaining convictions); Montz, supra note 37, at 131 (discussing with approval the
proposal of a Florida judge for increased training of prosecutors). Others have encouraged
naming prosecutors who have committed misconduct in judicial opinions. See, e.g., Adam
M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1062-63 (2009). Doing so may facilitate review by
state bar associations, which has been a common solution advocated by various
commentators. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 79, at 487-96 (describing the institutional
inadequacy of the steps taken by the judiciary in several states to address extreme
prosecutorial misconduct).
274 Henning, supra note 3, at 715.
275 Some judges and commentators argue that trial courts are in the best position to deal
with prosecutorial misconduct, so trial court decisions should be given a great deal of
deference. See, e.g., Hon. D. Brooks Smith, PolicingProsecutors: What Role Can Appellate
Courts Play?, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 835 (2010) (reasoning that trial judges are in a
better position than appellate judges to ensure that prosecutors fulfill the duties of their
office); Nidiry, supra note 12, at 1308 (discussing the ABA standards that emphasize trial
judges' options for responding to prosecutorial misconduct, including "sustaining the
objection for the record, instructing the jury to ignore the inappropriate comment,
reprimanding the attorney, and declaring a mistrial"). However, that position fails to deal
with the fact that trial court judges very rarely take any action when defense counsel fails
to object, as discussed in Part IV.a.2, and the actions that they do take may not fully
remedy the problem, as discussed in Part IV.A.1, which discusses harmless error.
276 Simon, supra note 151, at 580.
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trial-level remedies are certainly worth exploring, appellate court
277
remedies for individual defendants are particularly valuable.
In order to facilitate meaningful remedies for individual
defendants, this Article proposes significant changes to harmless
error analysis and moderate changes to the plain error doctrine as
applied in prosecutorial misconduct cases. 2 78 These changes affect
the standards used to evaluate harmless error and the way that
the burden of proving harmlessness is allocated.
A. COURTS SHOULD USE AN ERROR-FOCUSED RATHER THAN A GUILTFOCUSED APPROACH TO HARMLESS ERROR

The most fundamental change proposed here involves shifting
from a guilt-focused approach to harmless error. As discussed
above, courts frequently rely on the guilt-focused approach to
harmless error, which looks at the strength of the evidence against
the defendant. 279 But courts instead should use an error-focused
approach, looking at the likely effect that the error had on the
outcome of the trial. The latter approach is superior from a
cognitive bias perspective, and it could easily be implemented if
courts changed the factors that they consider in analyzing
harmless error.
1. Why an Error-Focused Approach Is Superior to a GuiltFocused Approach. As described in Part IV.A above, there are two
general approaches to determining whether an error was harmless:
(1) the guilt-focused approach, in which the court pretends that the
error did not occur and looks at the strength of the remaining
evidence; and (2) the error-focused approach, which looks at
whether and to what extent the error could have affected the
outcome of the trial. While courts more commonly use the guilt-

277 See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 668 (suggesting that "the courts' 'understanding
attitude' toward prosecutorial misconduct has added to the bulk of appellate litigation" and
that increasing the reversal rate in prosecutorial misconduct cases would likely lead to a
reduction in the number of instances of prosecutorial trial misconduct).
278 Harmless error is discussed first because it is so much more commonly used, as
explained in Part IV.A, and the changes to harmless error analysis impact the utility of the
plain error rule in these cases.
279 See supra Part V.A. 1.
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focused approach, 28 0 the cognitive bias research provides two clear
281
reasons why courts should use an error-focused approach instead.
First, courts commonly overestimate the strength of the
evidence against the defendant because of hindsight and outcome
biases. 28 2 Hindsight bias makes the defendant's conviction seem
more likely than it really was, and outcome bias compounds the
error by making it seem like more of a sound decision than it
really was. 28 3 Thus, the guilt-focused approach could lead courts to
overestimate the strength of the evidence against the defendant.
The error-focused approach, by contrast, frames the question of
harmless error in a way that suggests that the error may in fact
have affected the outcome of the case; that framing may help, at
least in a small way, counter the tendency to assume that the
conviction was inevitable. 28 4 Courts could still find an error to be
harmless, but having to articulate their analysis in terms of how
the error could have affected the reasoning is consistent with the
well-accepted de-biasing strategy of having to articulate the
285
opposite position.
Second, coherence-based reasoning and the story model suggest
that the guilt-focused approach is problematic. Specifically, the
research supporting both models show that decisionmakers look at
evidence holistically, rather than evaluating each piece of
information separately, and their assessments of the case as a
whole taint their understanding of the significance of any single

See, e.g., Walker, supra note 203, at 397.
These critiques likely apply to harmless error analysis generally, not just for
prosecutorial misconduct claims, but the soundness of applying them more broadly is
beyond the scope of this Article.
282 Findley & Scott, supra note 34, at 321.
283 See supra Part IV.B (discussing the impact of these procedural doctrines on appellate
review of prosecutorial misconduct claims); see also Findley & Scott, supra note 34, at 321
("With hindsight knowledge that a jury found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, judges are likely to be predisposed to view the conviction as both inevitable and a
sound decision, despite a procedural or constitutional error in the proceedings.").
284 See Solomon, supra note 202, at 1071 (noting that courts tend to find errors harmless
significantly more often when using a guilt-focused, rather than an error-focused, analysis).
285 See Findley & Scott, supra note 34, at 371 (summarizing research indicating that when
people articulate reasons that counter their own position, the "illusion of validity" can be
reduced); O'Brien, supra note 27, at 34 (proposing that a more thorough evaluation of
alternatives can help counter cognitive biases).
280

281
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piece of evidence. 28 6 Thus, exposure to prosecutorial misconduct
may have affected the jurors' analysis of the strength of the
remaining evidence; it is a cognitive fiction to try to evaluate the
remaining evidence while pretending that the error did not occur,
as required under the guilt-focused approach. Similarly, appellate
judges reviewing the evidence will likely be subject to similar
coherence-shifts, so the same reasoning applies to judicial
decisionmaking. 2 7 Additionally, focusing on the strength of the
evidence, including disturbing details of the case, may arouse the
judge's anger, which can also skew the reviewing judge's
28 8
decisionmaking.
For both these reasons, the error-focused approach is more
consistent with cognitive theories of decisionmaking, although the
error-focused approach is not without challenges. Specifically,
because coherence-based reasoning suggests that information is
evaluated holistically, courts should not move from one legal
fiction to another by assuming that they can determine whether
the error did in fact affect the outcome. Instead, courts should
"holistically evaluate the seriousness of the error and its likely
position in the constellation of facts that emerged at trial"28 9 and
ask whether it seems likely that the error affected the outcome.
2. How an Error-FocusedApproach Would Work. In order to
implement this shift from a guilt-focused to an error-focused
analysis, courts should change both the standard for when an

286

See supra Part III (asserting that juries are affected by prosecutorial misconduct more

than currently recognized); see also Simon, supra note 151, at 519 (observing that "[j]urors
with a slight initial inclination to acquit or convict are likely to amplify their perception of the
case," a tendency that is strengthened by "evidence that is [only] weakly probative of guilt').
281 See Simon, supra note 151, at 579 ("Since coherence effects occur without awareness,
the judge will decide in accordance with her perception of the evidence, which, unbeknownst
to her, has likely been skewed by the illicit variable."). Simon suggests, without much
discussion, that improper attorney comments would not have the same effects as
introduction of improper evidence on coherence-shifts, but he does conclude that coherencebased reasoning "provide[s] some unique insights into the jurisprudential dilemma by
adding weight to the error-based approach. These observations apply equally to evidentiary
and non-evidentiary errors." Id. at 580.
288 Id. at 583 ("In close cases, with the defendant somehow implicated in the crime and
with no one else to blame, there is a danger that the judge's mental representation of the
case will shift toward supporting a conclusion of guilt.").
289 Griffin, supra note 142, at 319.
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error is harmless and the factors used to determine whether the
standard has been met.
As for the standard that should be applied, an error should be
deemed to be harmless when it has only a slight chance of
contributing to the defendant's conviction. 290 This approach is
error-focused in that it evaluates the likely effect the error had on
the outcome. It is therefore superior to the current approach
distinguishing between constitutional and non-constitutional
errors, which is a historical anomaly. 29 1 It is also superior to other
common proposals that focus more narrowly on prosecutorial
intent, 292 which fail to account for the significant role that
cognitive biases play in prosecutorial trial misconduct, although
the analysis discussed below would allow courts to address cases
involving intentional misconduct as well.
In implementing this standard, the courts should reevaluate the
factors that contribute to harmless error analysis. 29 3 Specifically,

290

See Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 174 (suggesting that this definition is the

most appropriate one). Landes and Posner argue that "an error is harmless when it has no
(or, to be realistic, only a very slight) positive impact on the probability of conviction." Id.
They justify this approach on efficiency grounds, arguing that it would lead to the
optimization of reversals as compared to other possible standards. See id. (discussing
several other possible definitions that could be used and explaining why they are less
efficient than this definition); see also Griffin, supra note 142, at 318-19 (arguing that
courts should use a 'likely affected the outcome" standard).
291 Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 172. Another article suggests that advocates should
try to reframe many prosecutorial misconduct arguments as Sixth Amendment violations to
gain access to the constitutional harmless error standard, given how difficult it is for a litigant
to win under the non-constitutional standard. See Alford, supra note 79, at 524 (arguing that
federal habeas review provides a good forum for prosecutorial misconduct claims).
292 For example, Professor Gershman suggests that courts should consider a prosecutor's
subjective intent in evaluating whether prosecutorial misconduct affected the outcome of a
case. See generally Gershman, supra note 7 (arguing that a prosecutor's subjective intent
should be taken into account both in determining whether conduct was misconduct and
whether the error was harmless). Another intent-focused approach is offered by Professor
Kamin, who argues for per se reversible error when the prosecutor knew or should have
known that his conduct was improper. See generallyKamin, supra note 194 (discussing the
history of harmless error and suggesting two revisions to the doctrine). As described in
more detail below, however, courts applying the approach described in this Article would
focus on some of the same factors that Gershman and Kamin argue should be considered,
without minimizing remedies in cases in which the misconduct likely resulted from
cognitive biases.
293 See supra Part V.A. 1 (detailing the factors that courts typically consider, including the
severity of the misconduct, any corrective measures taken by the trial court, the strength of
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the courts should rely primarily on two factors: the severity and

pervasiveness of the misconduct, and the connection (if any)
between the particular misconduct at issue and the disputed issues
in the case. Courts could also consider, although with caution,
curative measures taken by the trial court, such as jury
instructions. Courts should not, however, consider the strength of
the remaining evidence or whether defense counsel provoked the
error. Each of these potential factors is explained below.
a. CrucialFactors:Severity and Pervasiveness of Misconduct,
and Connection to Trial Narratives. The most crucial factor
involves two related parts: the severity and pervasiveness of the
misconduct. Courts should focus primarily on the severity of the
misconduct, while also looking at the closely related question of
the pervasiveness of that misconduct. 294 The importance of these
factors comes from use of the error-focused approach rather than
the guilt-focused approach, as misconduct that is severe and
295
pervasive is more likely to cause harm.

Regarding severity, courts should cease their current practice of
excusing serious misconduct. Under current law, "[a] finding of
'harmless error' is not equivalent to a finding of trivial error.
Indeed, harmless error cases often reveal serious prosecutorial
create
misconduct." 296 Yet repeated and pervasive misconduct can 297
"a poison which the defense [cannot] drain from the case."

Of

course, "severity" is a somewhat malleable concept, raising
difficult line-drawing questions. A perfect resolution of that
difficulty is impossible, but courts should approach this question
from a number of angles. First, courts should increase their
emphasis on the importance of the pervasiveness of the
misconduct, something that courts already often consider. 298 For
the remaining "untainted" evidence, the other side's conduct that may have invited the
misconduct, and the details of the jury deliberations).
294 See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 142, at 319 (urging courts to focus on "the seriousness of
the error and its likely position in the constellation of facts that emerged at trial").
295 Cicchini, supra note 23, at 342 ("[Ihe more flagrant, intentional, and repetitive the
misconduct, the greater the resulting harm.").
296 Johns, supra note 20, at 517; see also id. (discussing an Innocence Project study
"documenting a number of cases where egregious misconduct was found to be harmless").
(quoting People v. McKenzie, No. A112837, 2007 WL 2193548, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App.
297 Id.
Aug. 1, 2007)).
298

See supra Part II.C.
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example, the Supreme Court in Berger concluded that the
misconduct was not harmless because, among other things, it was
"pronounced and persistent." 299
Some commentators have
similarly noted that courts currently consider pervasiveness as a
factor in analyzing harmless error.30 0 Under an error-focused
approach, pervasiveness would become a more significant part of
the court's analysis, as the repetition of the misconduct would
increase the likelihood that the jury would be influenced by it.
Furthermore, courts should distinguish between trivial
misconduct and more severe misconduct.3 0 1 Misconduct might be
trivial in cases that were close as to whether the conduct was truly
inappropriate. 30 2 Misconduct might also be treated as trivial when
the violation was more about a technical wording issue rather than
inflammatory or emotional appeals.3 03 Other types of misconduct,
such as misstatements about the presumptions of innocence or
burdens of proof, would inherently be more serious as they could
30 4
affect the jurors' understanding of the relevant law.
Additionally, courts should be particularly concerned about the
potential effects of misconduct that involves depersonalization. As
noted above in Part II.B, research into moral disengagement
suggests that depersonalization is a powerful tool that allows
actors to reach decisions that they would not otherwise reach.
Prosecutors systematically depersonalize criminal defendants in a
variety of ways. 30 5 Dehumanization can lead to moral exclusion,
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935).
See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 5, at 423 ("The more numerous the instances [of
misconduct], the more likely that the cumulative effect of the errors will require reversal.").
301 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 13, at 663-66 (proposing that courts employ a sliding
scale for distinguishing between trivial and severe misconduct).
302 See id. at 666 (arguing that this approach would require the courts to offer more clarity
about the extent to which they view instances of misconduct as trivial or serious).
303 Cf. id. (noting that use of a sliding scale would discourage reversal "for minor or
technical violations that probably did not affect the verdict"); see also Bazelon, supra note 5,
at 423 (noting that courts sometimes consider whether misconduct was "truly blatant and
inflammatory").
304 See Berger, supra note 191, at 550-51 (discussing a case in which the prosecutor in
closing argument told the jury that it no longer had to apply the presumption of innocence,
and questioning how the significant evidence of guilt could ever "moot the issue of whether
the jury properly understood the applicable law").
305 See Cummings, supra note 20, at 2154-56 (discussing, for example, use of blanket
terms and terms distinguishing criminals from non-criminals).
299
300
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placing those stigmatized "outside the boundary in which moral
of fairness apply." 30 6
values, rules, and considerations
Furthermore, this dehumanization can have subconscious,
neurological effects, in that people may fail to activate the part of
the brain typically involved in social perception when viewing
members of highly stigmatized groups. 30 7 Thus, prosecutorial
misconduct that involves dehumanizing images is inherently
severe, even if it is not repeated and even if defense counsel failed
308
to object.
In assessing severity, courts should also look carefully at the
connection between the particular misconduct and the disputed
issue(s) in the case. 30 9 Courts should analyze the theories offered by
both the prosecution and the defense to see if the misconduct
"affects the entire narrative arc or merely a discrete or insignificant
piece of it."310 For example, if the disputed issues in a particular
case involves credibility determinations, then prosecutorial
misconduct may well affect the outcome, particularly if the
misconduct involves improper vouching for the prosecution's
witnesses or improper attacks on defense counsel's credibility.
Similarly, prosecutorial misconduct involving the defendant's
failure to offer evidence (shifting the burden of proof) would be more
likely to affect the outcome if the disputed issue in the case was the
306 Philip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, HistoricalDehumanization,
and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 293 (2008)
(quotation omitted).
307 Id. at 294 (summarizing results from a study indicating that "[t]hose who are the least
value in the culture were not deemed worthy of social consideration on a neurological level").
308 If defense counsel did object, that factor could be slightly useful toward a finding of
severity, in that defense counsel both noticed the misconduct and was willing to risk drawing
attention to the misconduct or angering jurors by interrupting. See supra notes 251-59 and
accompanying text (discussing reasons why defense counsel may not object). The lack of
objection, in contrast, may provide some slight inference against severity, in that the failure to
object could be read to suggest that defense counsel may have failed to pick up on the
misconduct (and therefore a jury would similarly have been unlikely to do so as well). But the
other reasons that defense counsel may not have objected mean that courts should not rely
heavily at all on the lack of a defense objection when considering severity.
309 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 13, at 662 (noting that harmless error should consider,
among other things, "whether the prosecutor's statement was so irrelevant to the case at
hand").
310 Griffin, supra note 142, at 319. Griffin was talking about evidentiary errors rather
than prosecutorial misconduct, but the narrative arc of the case is perhaps even more
important in prosecutorial misconduct cases.
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identity of the person who committed the crime than if the
defendant conceded involvement in the crime but challenged proof
of intent. By contrast, highly inflammatory images or words can
affect the entire trial, even if they are not linked directly to a
31
specific count. '
This focus on the severity of the misconduct and its interaction
with trial narratives more accurately reflects the importance of the
error-focused approach, as explained by the cognitive bias research
above, and it promotes respect for the judiciary. 3 12 Although this
approach is not without its challenges, it still represents an
improvement on the current guilt-focused approach taken by most
courts.
The current guilt-focused approach "undercuts the
expressive, educational, and deterrent functions of appellate
review."3 13 By focusing instead on the severity of the misconduct,
courts can "vindicate significant rights while discouraging
reversals for minor or technical violations that probably did not
affect the verdict." 314 Similarly, courts could uphold convictions
even in the face of severe errors if they were convinced that the
particular circumstances of the case make it unlikely that the
31 5
error affected the verdict.
b. Factors that Should be Relied on Only with Significant
Caution: Jury Instructions and Other Curative Measures. Courts
should also be far more cautious than they currently are about
311 See, e.g., In re Glasmann, 286 P.3d 673, 681 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) ("In this case, the
use of highly inflammatory images unrelated to any specific count was misconduct that
contaminated the entire proceedings.").
312 See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 662-63 ("The danger of promoting a cynical disrespect
for the judiciary seems greatest when affirmance follows truly outrageous misconduct.").
313 Simon, supra note 151, at 582; see also Fisher, supra note 199, at 1321 ("In order to
properly protect the process values inherent in the right to due process, the due process
fairness inquiry must remain separate from the determination of impact on the outcome.
Otherwise, constitutional limitations on prosecutorial conduct would fluctuate with the
strength of the state's case against the defendant, with outrageously egregious conduct
permissible when the defendant's guilt seems apparent. When such outrageous conduct is
permitted, criminal proceedings lose their appearance of fairness. This ends-justifies-themeans approach to defining due process is incompatible with the process goals of the
criminal justice system." (footnotes omitted)).
314 Alschuler, supra note 13, at 666.
315 See Berger, supra note 191, at 552 (discussing circumstances that could be used to find
that a typically serious error, such as a misstatement of the applicable law, may not
actually be serious in the context of a particular case in which other factors suggest that the
outcome was not affected).
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concluding that a trial court's curative measures, especially jury
instructions, make an error harmless. Under current law, courts
often rely on the curative effect of jury instructions, presuming
that juries will follow those instructions. 316 This presumption
covers both general instructions given in every case, such as an
instruction that attorneys' comments are not evidence, and specific
instructions to disregard comments that the trial court declared to
be improper. 3 17
In fact, blanket presumptions about the
effectiveness of limiting instructions are exercises in pure
fiction. 318 Numerous judges and commentators have recognized
this fiction, but courts continue to rely on limiting instructions as
essential to the operation of the jury system. 319
Cognitive bias research shows that this reliance on limiting
instructions is based on a number of flawed assumptions, and
more importantly, offers a potential way forward that can balance
judicial economy with protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial.
First, courts' reliance on limiting instructions rests on an incorrect
assumption that any piece of evidence or information can be
cleanly excised from the way that the trial's narrative unfolds. 320
As explained above in the sections on the story model of juror
deliberation and coherence-based reasoning, however, information
may influence decisionmakers in ways that they do not realize and
may taint their evaluation of other unrelated information. 321
Because of this imperceptible taint, despite jurors' best efforts,
316 See Montz, supra note 37, at 99-100 (discussing cases in which courts concluded that
errors in reading from transcripts not in evidence to the jury were harmless because of very
carefully tailored jury instructions).
317 See Cicchini, supra note 23, at 351-52 (discussing a case where the court held that jury
instructions that prosecutors' arguments are not evidence cured an improper closing
argument). Cicchini goes on to argue that when the objection concerns the prosecutor's
improper argument, then instruction on what constitutes proper evidence is irrelevant. Id.
at 352.
31s Griffin, supra note 142, at 321.
319 Id. at 322-23 (summarizing critiques of limiting instructions from, among others, Justice
Robert Jackson and Judge Learned Hand, and discussing the reasons why courts continue to
rely on limiting instructions in spite of these long-standing and vigorous critiques).
320 Id.
321 See

supra Part III; see also Griffin, supra note 142, at 324-25 (discussing the way that
each new piece of evidence fits into the "shifting mosaic" of the case and the difficulties of
untangling explicit and implicit influences on decisionmaking (quoting United States v.
Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1968))).
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they cannot effectively disregard the improper information. 322
Social science research shows "that limiting instructions fall short
when it comes to any highly salient or emotionally charged
content."323 Therefore, courts should stop repeating the fiction
that an error is harmless in part because of typical limiting
instructions.
Instead, courts should consider adopting proposals regarding
limiting instructions that are more grounded in the social science
research. 324 These proposals include telling jurors why they have
been told to disregard certain information and allowing jurors to
deliberate on and reaffirm their commitment to ignoring that
information. 325 Such an instruction would only be given in a
prosecutorial misconduct case if the trial court did conclude that at
least some conduct was error; it would not be applied in cases
where the trial court allowed the prosecutor to commit misconduct
or where the defendant failed to object. It could, however, be
coupled with a general de-biasing instruction that would help
minimize the impacts of cognitive bias on general deliberation,
apart from the specific issue of prosecutorial misconduct. 326 Thus,
this factor would need to be approached significantly more
cautiously than under current case law.
Furthermore, courts should look carefully at the trial court's
other actions. As explained in Part IV.A.2 above, when a trial judge
overrules an objection to improper prosecutorial comments, the jury
may see that as judicial approval of the comment. And even if the
judge sustains an objection, the instruction to disregard might
highlight the misconduct. Courts should therefore look carefully at
the trial court's actions and should be cautious about concluding
that they necessarily cured any prejudice to the defendant.
c. Factors that Should Not Be Used: Strength of the Other
Evidence and Invited Error. Perhaps the biggest change to the
harmless error analysis proposed here is the rejection of both the
322

Griffin, supra note 142, at 324.

323

Id.

See, e.g., id. at 330-32 (summarizing various proposals).
See id. at 330 (noting that these approaches may encourage jurors to "buy into the
rationale for exclusion").
326 See Simon, supra note 151, at 543-44, 548-49, 569-74 (discussing debiasing
instructions).
324
325

372

GEORGIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 49:309

strength of the other evidence and the invited error doctrine. The
strength of the other evidence is often the most important factor
under current formulations of harmless error analysis, as the
guilt-focused approach is framed in terms of the strength of the
other evidence. 327 But as explained above, cognitive bias research
consistently demonstrates that decisionmakers cannot effectively
evaluate the strength of other evidence without there being some
taint from the error. The story model and coherence-based
reasoning both show that jurors likely make decisions holistically
rather than based on a mathematical calculation about the value
of each thing that happens in the trial, and outcome and hindsight
bias research shows that reviewing decisionmakers are likely to
under-weigh the potential taint from the error. For these reasons,
courts should reject reliance on the strength of the rest of the
evidence as a factor for harmless error. Presumably, if the other
evidence is strong, then the prosecution should be able to obtain a
conviction again upon retrial. 328 And, defendants are entitled to a
329
fair trial regardless of factual guilt.
Additionally, courts should not use "invited error" as an excuse
for serious and pervasive misconduct. The "invited error" or
"invited response" rule allows courts to excuse prosecutorial trial
misconduct that occurs during rebuttal closing: "If the prosecutor's
misconduct.., was provoked by defense counsel's own improper
argument, reviewing courts will generally conclude that the
prosecutor was simply 'righting the scale' so that reversal of the
defendant's conviction is not required."330 The ABA Standards for
Justice
explicitly
authorize
such
responsive
Criminal
331
arguments.
Analytically, the invited error doctrine relates to
the question of whether the comments were misconduct: if the
See supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
Of course, subsequent events may make it hard for the prosecution to put on the exact
same evidence, but the prosecutor who commits misconduct would be the one who would
create that risk in a particular case.
329 See, e.g., Cicchini, supra note 23, at 346-47 (describing the criticisms of the current
doctrine, which seems to suggest that prosecutorial misconduct is acceptable when the state
has a strong case).
330 Bazelon, supra note 5, at 423.
331 See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 13, at 109 ("[A] prosecutor may be justified in making
such a reply to an improper argument of defense counsel if made without provocation by the
prosecutor.").
327

328
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defense counsel provoked the response by making improper
argument, then by definition it is not improper for the courts to
respond. But courts often apply this doctrine under harmless
error analysis by saying that they do not need to reverse because
of the invited error doctrine. 32 In doing so, courts often use
invited error to excuse as harmless even very significant
prosecutorial misconduct. 333 When this happens, courts should not
let defense misbehavior blind them to the real issues in the case,
which should be (1) whether the prosecutor's comments were
proper, and (2) if not, whether the improper comments were likely
3 34
to have affected the outcome of the case.
B. COURTS SHOULD RETHINK ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF
IN PROSECUTORIAL TRIAL MISCONDUCT CASES

Although the courts should consistently take an error-focused
approach to harmless error, as described above, the burden of
proof for determining whether the misconduct affected the
outcome should depend on whether the misconduct was objected to
at trial. If so, then the prosecution should bear the burden of
showing that the misconduct was harmless. If not, then the
defendant should bear the burden of showing that the error did
affect the outcome.
1. The Prosecution Should Generally Bear the Burden of
Proving that ProsecutorialTrial Misconduct Was Harmless. When
the defendant objects to alleged prosecutorial misconduct at trial
and the appellate court concludes that the prosecutor did in fact
commit misconduct, then the prosecution should bear the burden

332 See, e.g., Tara J. Tobin, Note, Miscarriageof Justice During Closing Arguments by an
Overzealous Prosecutorand a Timid Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 45 S.D. L. REV. 186,
219 (2000) ("As an effective tool to affirm convictions despite the presence of prosecutorial
misconduct, the invited response doctrine is utilized in all jurisdictions ....
").
333 Nidiry, supra note 12, at 1320-21 ('The prosecutor is not free to make any response
she desires to a defense excess; her response must be measured and can only go so far as to
be equivalent to the defendant's impropriety. In practice, however, limitations on invited
response often give way, leaving prosecutors a blanket license for improper argument."
(footnotes omitted)).
334 See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 658 (asserting that the central inquiry is "whether the
prosecutor's behavior was likely to induce a decision not based on a rational assessment of
the evidence").
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of proving that the misconduct was harmless. Specifically, the
prosecution would have to show that there was only a slight
chance that the misconduct contributed to the defendant's
conviction. 335 If the prosecution fails to meet this burden, then the
defendant's conviction should be reversed. This approach has
several benefits and is a better approach than requiring per se
reversal in prosecutorial trial misconduct cases.
The first benefit of this approach is that placing the burden on
the state minimizes the effect of hindsight bias. 336 Although this
approach is unlikely to completely eliminate the effect of hindsight
or outcome bias on harmless error analysis, 337 the combination of
focusing on the likely effect of the error on the verdict and
requiring the prosecution to bear the burden of justifying
affirmance should help combat these biases.
This approach is also supported by public policy considerations.
"[I]t would be unfair to allow the prosecutor to break rules of
conduct and then require that the defendant prove the misconduct
Prosecutorial
changed the outcome of the proceeding. 3 38
335 Landes and Posner argue that "an error is harmless when it has no (or, to be realistic,
only a very slight) positive impact on the probability of conviction." Landes & Posner, supra
note 195, at 174. They justify this approach on efficiency grounds, arguing that it would
lead to the optimization of reversals as compared to other possible standards. See id.
(discussing several other possible definitions that could be used and explaining why they
are less efficient than this definition). Landes and Posner did not specifically discuss who
would bear the burden of meeting this standard, but the standard seems to implicitly place
the burden on the state, in the same way that the state must show that an error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt under the current constitutional harmless error standard. Id. at
172. Additional arguments for why the state should bear the burden of proof are discussed
below.
336 Findley & Scott, supra note 34, at 322 ('The effect of hindsight bias on appellate and
postconviction review is likely to be even more pronounced in situations where the burden
of persuasion is placed on the defendant.").
331 Id. at 321 ('To some extent, placing the burden of proving the harmless nature of an error
on the beneficiary of the error-in criminal cases, requiring the government to prove harmless
error beyond a reasonable doubt-might be intended to mitigate the effects of hindsight and
outcome biases. Nonetheless, courts routinely find significant errors harmless, and that is
partly because hindsight bias and outcome bias work in tandem with other values, such as a
desire to respect finality and avoid wasteful retrials of obviously guilty defendants." (footnotes
omitted)).
338 Fisher, supra note 199, at 1320. Although defendants often bear a burden of showing
that an error was not harmless (e.g., in cases involving the erroneous admission of evidence
against the defendant), the value of finality and other interests in those cases outweighs the
policy considerations at play in prosecutorial trial misconduct cases, as discussed in this

2015]

MITIGATING FOUL BLOWS

375

misconduct may benefit the prosecution at trial, so the prosecution
should bear the burden of showing that it did not actually receive
a benefit from this behavior. 339 Additionally, the prosecution
rather than the defendant is in a position to try to prevent
misconduct from happening in the first place. 340 Under current
law, however, prosecutors have incentives to commit misconduct
when they have a weak case3 41 and when they have a strong
case.342 By contrast, use of an error-focused analysis with the
burden of proof on the prosecution should incentivize prosecutors
to take steps to avoid committing misconduct when possible. 343 Of
course, this approach will not eliminate all misconduct, as
cognitive biases likely play a significant role in prosecutorial
misconduct, as explained above, but it should help change
3 44
behavior in some cases.
Requiring the prosecution to bear the burden of proving
harmlessness is generally a better policy choice than imposing per
paragraph. It is beyond the scope of this Article to weigh the competing interests as needed
for deciding whether the rule proposed in this Article should apply in other contexts.
339 See id. at 1317-18 (justifying placement of this burden on the state by reference to
"common law policy.., that the party benefiting from the prosecutorial misconduct-the
State-should have the burden of proving its harmlessness").
340

Id. at 1319.

See Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 184-85 (noting that under current law,
prosecutors have an incentive to commit intentional error when their case is weak, as the
misconduct minimizes the likelihood of an acquittal, which cannot be appealed).
141 See Cicchini, supra note 23, at 347 (noting that judges often refuse to grant mistrials
based on a finding that the defendant is clearly guilty regardless of the prosecutorial
341

misconduct).
343 Fisher, supra note 199, at 1323; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 174
(arguing that this approach to harmless error is the most efficient approach).
344 Professor Kamin effectively describes the value in changing the incentives related to
prosecutorial trial misconduct:
That I advocate a rule that will result in a greater deterrent effect on
prosecutors is not to imply that I believe all prosecutors are venal, careless,
or incompetent. My beliefs are quite the contrary. Prosecutors, however,
like the rest of us, are influenced, at least to some degree, by the costs and
benefits society imposes on us. Not everyone would become a murderer if
the state's prohibition on murder were done away with, but we have a
prohibition on murder at least in part because we believe that fewer people
will kill if we do. Thus, although I do not believe that most prosecutors
misbehave as much as they believe they can get away with it, I do believe
that if the likelihood of reversal were increased, they would engage in
misconduct less often.
Kamin, supra note 194, at 86.
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Professor
se reversal in prosecutorial misconduct cases. 34 5
Alschuler noted long ago the foolishness of providing a retrial
"In such
when doing so is merely an idle gesture. 346
circumstances, the result of a new trial would be the same, and the
insult to the dignity of the process would not be thereby
undone." 347 When a court has determined that the error really was
harmless, then the societal interests in finality of judgments
348
outweigh any value in forcing a retrial.
This approach is also consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Hasting, which held that federal
courts' supervisory powers are limited to cases of prejudicial
error. 349 Under Hasting, federal courts cannot dispense with
harmless error analysis, but must instead analyze harmless error
before providing a remedy to an individual defendant. 350 Any
imposition of a per se reversal remedy would require overruling
Hasting,351 but the proposed standard this Article advocates does
not run afoul of Hasting.
Finally, and most significantly, if the courts were to adopt a per
se reversal rule in prosecutorial misconduct cases, that might put
undue pressure on courts' analysis of whether certain behavior
was in fact misconduct. Under current law, courts' labeling of
behavior as prosecutorial misconduct is "almost cost-free" because
34- Contra id. at 85-86 (proposing a per se prejudice rule). The word "generally" is
important here, however, as there is some support for the idea that race-based prosecutorial
misconduct should be treated differently than other types of misconduct. See, e.g., State v.
Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 559 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (Madsen, C.J., concurring) ("Rather than
engage in an unconvincing attempt to show the error here was not harmless, the court
should hold instead that the prosecutor's injection of racial discrimination into this case
cannot be countenanced at all, not even to the extent of contemplating to any degree that
error might be harmless."). I intend to explore this issue in more detail in my next article.
346 Alschuler, supra note 13, at 663.
347 Fisher, supra note 199, at 1317.
348 Id. at 1316-17.
349 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983).
35o See, e.g., Henning, supra note 3, at 718 ("Similarly, violations of a defendant's
constitutional rights that do not involve a structural error in the proceedings require a
harmless error analysis. If the government can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
violation did not contribute to the conviction, then the court may not grant a remedy despite
the violation. Therefore, the Constitution does not provide a remedy to deter future
prosecutorial misconduct, absent a finding of harm to the defendant." (footnote omitted)).
351 See Kamin, supra note 194, at 78 (recognizing that the per se rule he proposes would
require overruling Hasting).
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the harmless error doctrine allows courts to avoid providing any
remedy for the misconduct when the courts conclude that it did not
affect the outcome. 352 If the pendulum swings too far the other
way, however, courts will be even more likely than they are now to
conclude that prosecutorial behavior that should be misconduct is
in fact proper. 353 Thus, the best approach to harmless error in
prosecutorial misconduct is to require the prosecution to bear the
burden of proving that the error did not impact the verdict, using
the factors described in Part V.A.2 above.
2. When Defense Counsel Failed to Object at Trial, then the
Defendant Should Bear the Burden of Proving that Misconduct
Affected the Outcome but Should Not Have Additional Penalties
Imposed Under the Plain Error Doctrine. However, when the
defendant fails to object at trial, then it is appropriate for the
defendant to bear the burden of showing that there is at least a
slight risk that the misconduct affected the outcome.
The
standard would not change, in that the court would still be looking
at whether there was a slight chance that the error contributed to
the defendant's conviction. 354 But the defendant would bear the
burden of making that showing, in lieu of any other penalties for
the failure to object.
When defense counsel fails to object at trial to misconduct, it is
appropriate to make the defendant bear the burden of showing
that the error was not harmless. This approach would continue to
incentivize defense counsel to object at trial when possible.
Defense counsel would still be likely to object when a prosecutor's
statement was clearly misconduct and in situations where the trial
35
court could provide a meaningful remedy for the misconduct.
And if defense counsel chose not to object for tactical reasons, such
as not drawing attention to the comment, then the consequences of
that tactical decision would be a shift in the burden of proof for
harmless error analysis on appeal. Under this approach, the
352

Henning, supra note 3, at 722.

353 See supra Part II.A (summarizing the difficult line-drawing questions courts often face

in prosecutorial trial misconduct cases).
354 See supra note 290 and accompanying text (arguing for the "slight chance" standard).
355 Cf. Alschuler, supra note 13, at 652 (noting differences between the effectiveness and
efficiency of remedies like mistrials when misconduct happens early in a trial versus late in
a trial).
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failure to object would likely make defense counsel's argument on
the severity of the misconduct more difficult, but the appellate
court could still consider whether the misconduct was likely to
have affected the outcome of the trial, reversing if appropriate or
affirming if the misconduct was unlikely to have affected the
outcome.
But the burden of proving harmless error should be the only
penalty imposed for the failure to object. As explained in Part
IV.A.2 above, courts applying plain error analysis under current
law often impose additional burdens on the defendants by
requiring them to show that the error was clearly contrary to law
(i.e., "plain") or flagrant and ill-intentioned. Currently, courts can
duck difficult questions of drawing clear lines about what
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct by concluding that any error
was not plain, without really analyzing whether an error
occurred. 356 This approach to plain error can exacerbate cognitive
biases in judges by encouraging them to engage in conclusory
rather than carefully reasoned decisions, and it can contribute to
courts being overly confident about the lack of error and the
harmlessness of that error. 357 The current approach also fails to
reflect the reality that jurors may be affected by subtle misconduct
as well as more obvious misconduct.3 58 Therefore, the courts
should reject the "plain" part of plain error analysis, and instead
should first consider whether there was an error (whether the
prosecutor actually committed misconduct), and then whether the
error was harmless (requiring the defendant to bear the burden of
359
proof).
This approach would make it easier for courts to draw clearer
lines regarding what behavior
constitutes
prosecutorial
misconduct.3 60
If appellate courts draw clearer lines about
appropriate versus inappropriate behavior, "this will assist
See supranotes 229-31 and accompanying text.
Berger, supra note 191, at 541-42.
358 See id. at 544-45 (discussing how other types of subtle errors can nevertheless affect
the outcome of a trial); supra Part III (regarding the ways that juror decisionmaking can be
affected by things that do not seem obvious at the time, including the way that one piece of
information can taint a juror's perception of analytically unrelated information).
359 Carter, supra note 239, at 952-53; Gershman, supra note 7, at 133.
36 Morrow & Larson, supra note 5, at 402-03.
356
357
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prosecutors in avoiding, defense attorneys in identifying, and trial
361
courts in remedying incidents of prosecutorial error."
Specifically, trial courts in future cases will have clearer guidance
about when objections should be sustained or overruled. 362 And
future appellate courts will be able to debate the lines between
proper and improper conduct more effectively if their decisions are
363
not muddied by considerations of whether an error was plain.
As a result of clearer case law, prosecutors will be better able to
understand the line between proper and improper conduct, and
stay on the correct side of the line.3 64 Additionally, the added
clarifications between proper and improper comments can make it
easier for defense counsel to object when prosecutors do cross the
line. These benefits will only come, however, from appellate courts
taking seriously their responsibilities to clarify the law and offer
guidance to future litigants, 365 which requires deviating from the
requirement of showing that unobjected-to error was plain.
Such an approach is within appellate courts' broad discretion to
deviate from typical plain error analysis. 366 That discretion is
important for giving courts the necessary room to clarify the law
and to ensure fair trials. 367 Courts often exercise this discretion to

361 Id. at 404.
362See Berger, supra note 191, at 548-49 (arguing that having courts focus on whether
unpreserved conduct was error rather than whether any error was obvious is valuable
because it ensures "that (1) the court creates a reference point for future cases that deal
with the same issue; (2) the parties can determine whether the court 'got it right,' and,
therefore whether to petition for further appellate review or reconsideration; and (3) the
judges on the court can satisfy themselves, as much as possible, that the court's opinion
accurately appreciates the significance of error and its consequences under the case's
particular facts" (footnote omitted)).
363 Id.

at 549.

36 Cf. id. at 546 ("[1]n many cases, the obviousness of the error may be difficult to discern
because it requires the application of a legal rule that is facially clear but unclear when
applied to the facts of the defendant's case."). This is yet another reason why a focus on the
"plain" part of plain error analysis is counterproductive, particularly regarding issues like
prosecutorial misconduct that require such careful analysis of the facts.
365 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 13, at 655 (noting the important role appellate courts
play in helping lawyers and trial courts handle prosecutorial trial misconduct).
366See Carter, supra note 239, at 948 (listing several exceptions to the preservation of
error requirement in criminal cases); see also id. at 947 (noting that "principles of
fundamental justice frequently oblige the appellate courts to deviate from the preservation
of error requirement and reverse unpreserved issues, especially in criminal cases").
367 Weigand, supra note 229, at 188-89.

380

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:309

consider a wide variety of alleged errors, 368 in order to explain the
law clearly and to promote justice. 369 Both of those interests are
implicated in cases involving prosecutorial trial misconduct. This
Article therefore proposes that courts should exercise that
discretion in prosecutorial trial misconduct cases to avoid
confusing their analyses of whether a prosecutor committed
misconduct and whether that misconduct was harmful 370 while
still imposing some penalty on the defendant for the failure to
object, in the form of the burden of proving that the error was not
harmless.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although research strongly suggests that prosecutorial trial
misconduct is pervasive and may have significant effects on juror
and reviewing court decisions, the current legal standards impose
excessive procedural barriers for defendants seeking remedies for
prosecutorial trial misconduct. This Article therefore proposes
changes to harmless error analysis and the plain error doctrine as
applied in prosecutorial trial misconduct cases. If courts adopt
these proposals, then they would consistently engage in a two-step
analysis of prosecutorial trial misconduct claims. As a threshold
matter, courts would first consider whether the prosecutor's
behavior was in fact misconduct. 371 If the prosecutor did engage in

368 See generally Carter, supra note 239 (cataloging the wide variety of types of claims that
appellate courts consider even when those claims were not preserved below).
369 See Weigand, supra note 229, at 191 ("[The appellate court has a duty to dispense,
administer, and promote justice regardless of any lack of preservation by counsel.").
370 See supra Part IV.A.2 (explaining that as currently applied in prosecutorial trial
misconduct cases, the plain error rule often leads to the confusion of whether there was
error and whether it was harmful, and it sometimes also brings in prosecutorial intent
when that would not otherwise be part of the court's analysis); see also Carter, supra note
239, at 980 (noting that authors of studies on wrongful convictions argue for the importance
of appellate courts reviewing unpreserved issues and arguing that justice requires courts to
be open to some claims, even when they were not raised at trial); id. at 971 & n.173
(including prosecutorial misconduct within the "public policy" category of errors that should
be reviewed notwithstanding a failure to object at trial).
371 If courts use an error-focused approach to harmless error, they must first decide if an
error occurred. See Kamin, supra note 194, at 6 (correctly arguing that evaluating harmless
error before determining whether there was error stifles the development of the substantive
law on what conduct is actually proper). Similarly, as discussed in Part V.B.2, courts could
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misconduct, then the court should consider whether the
prosecutor's misconduct was harmless. In doing so, the court
should reverse unless it concludes that the misconduct has only a
slight chance of contributing to the defendant's conviction. 372 In
making that determination, the court should rely primarily on the
severity of the misconduct and how it relates to the trial's
narratives; it should not consider the strength of the evidence
against the defendant.3 7 3 The prosecution should bear the burden
of proof in cases in which defense counsel objected to the
misconduct, while the defendant should bear the burden of proof in
the absence of an objection.
In total, these changes are meant to have three effects: (1) to
minimize the incentives in existing case law for prosecutors to
commit misconduct, intentionally or unintentionally; (2) to
encourage courts to draw clearer lines about what behavior is or is
not misconduct; and (3) to improve the courts' response to
misconduct when it does occur.
As to the first point, even though prosecutors may not
consciously choose to engage in prosecutorial misconduct based on
the incentives created by current case law, those incentives may
put some pressure on their subconscious decisionmaking, as
discussed in Part IV.A above. For example, those pressures may
create more space for moral disengagement, and they may
contribute to strengthening prosecutors' perceptions that the
defendants they prosecute must be guilty.
Similarly, courts
repeatedly invoke the strength of the evidence against defendants
in harmless error discussions, which suggests to prosecutors that
the defendants really were guilty, even when cognitive bias
research shows the inherent fallacy in trying to evaluate the
strength of other evidence apart from the taint of an error.
Therefore, it is good policy to remove incentives for prosecutors to
commit trial misconduct, as doing so should reduce the
subconscious cognitive biases that may contribute to prosecutorial

not use the plain error doctrine as a threshold matter to avoid analyzing whether a
prosecutor's behavior constituted misconduct.
372 See supra note 290 (explaining the "slight chance" analysis).
373 See supra Part V.A.2.
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misconduct, as well as reducing the incentives for prosecutors to
374
intentionally commit misconduct.
Additionally, these changes should lead to more clarity in
judicial decisionmaking about what is and is not misconduct. 375
That is true because courts will not have the option of ducking
difficult line-drawing questions by relying on the defense
attorney's failure to object or by skipping straight to harmless
error without deciding whether an error occurred. And if the
courts actually do provide more clarity about the lines between
proper and improper conduct, then defense counsel will actually be
in a better position to be able to object during the heat of trial,
which should minimize concerns about deviating from the typical
plain error rule. Furthermore, defendants will still bear the
burden of proving misconduct was not harmless when they fail to
object at trial, which serves the goals underlying the plain error
doctrine.
Finally, and most importantly, these solutions should help
provide more meaningful remedies for individuals who have been
affected by prosecutorial misconduct. This approach contributes to
"substantive justice," which involves both getting the facts right
and doing so without resorting to "means that are either legally
forbidden or procedurally off-limits." 376 While other systemic
approaches to combatting prosecutorial trial misconduct are
potentially valuable as well, appellate courts should provide
meaningful substantive justice to defendants whose cases were
tainted by prosecutorial trial misconduct. Meaningful remedies in
individual cases are essential for ensuring the health of the
criminal justice system, and appellate courts are in the best
position to evaluate the case as a whole and to mitigate
prosecutorial foul blows.

374 See Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 176 (arguing that the incentive to avoid or
induce errors depends on the sanctions that an appellate court imposes).
375 See also Kamin, supra note 194, at 6 (arguing that changing harmless error analysis
should also increase clarity of the substantive law on what constitutes prosecutorial
misconduct).
376 Griffin, supra note 142, at 290.

